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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j). The Supreme Court originally had jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3Xi) but transferred this matter to the Utah Court of 
Appeals for disposition pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Statement of Issues 
1. Did the district court apply the incorrect legal standard in denying 
Defendant/Appellant Adrenalin Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Advanced Restoration Systems' 
("ARS") Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Punitive Damages and Second Cause of 
Action and in granting Plaintiffs', Bette Samuelsen, Melisa Adams, and Jacqueline 
Chamorro ("Plaintiffs"), Motion for Finding of Prima Facie Case for Punitive Damages 
Claim, when it found plaintiffs established a prima facie case of punitive damages 
without clear and convincing evidence that ARS acted recklessly and with actual 
knowledge that its conduct would likely result in substantial harm to another? 
2. Did the district court farther err in not requiring clear and convincing proof 
of reckless and knowing conduct on the part of an ARS managerial-level employee when 
it found Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of punitive damages? 
3. Did the district court err by ruling that Plaintiffs may maintain separate 
causes of action for vicarious liability and for negligent hiring, training, and supervision, 
even though ARS conceded that its employees were acting within the course and scope of 
their employment at all relevant times and conceded liability for its employees' acts? 
vi 
B. Standard of Review 
"Questions of law are reviewed for correctness[.]" Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 
50, f 7, 94 P.3d 915. The question of whether a trial court erred in denying summary 
judgment when applying the proper legal standard governing a claim is a matter of law 
and is reviewed for correctness with no deference given to the lower court's legal 
conclusions. Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, ^ 
8, 167 P.3d 1080. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
ARS preserved the issues it now seeks to appeal at R. 801-975, 1422-32, and 
pages 18-27 and 33-37 of the Transcript (R. at 1592). ARS also timely petitioned for 
interlocutory appeal of the district court's order. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
Regarding the first two issues on appeal, the determinative statute is Utah Code 
Ann. §78-18-l(l)(a)(2007):1 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded 
only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established 
by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor 
are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, 
or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a 
disregard of, the rights of others. 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (2007) was renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201 in 
2008. The text of paragraph (l)(a) is identical in both the current and the 2007 versions 
of the statute. To avoid any confusion, ARS will cite to the current numbering of the 
statute in this Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below, 
This case involves an unfortunate accident, not a malicious or intentional act 
bordering on the criminal. ARS is a flood and fire remediation contractor who responded 
to a flood at an IHC Instacare clinic in Logan, Utah ("IHC Clinic" or "the Clinic") on 
Sunday morning, June 24, 2007. Upon arriving at the Clinic, ARS's two technicians 
discovered significant amounts of standing water in the basement and used a gas-powered 
pump inside the Clinic in order to remove the water. The pump emitted carbon monoxide 
into the Clinic and allegedly exposed employees of the Clinic, including Plaintiffs, to 
carbon monoxide. The ARS technicians did not appreciate that the gas-powered pump 
would emit carbon monoxide under these circumstances and therefore did not appreciate 
that it would pose any danger to those working inside of the IHC Clinic. The ARS 
technicians were simply trying to remove the water. 
Plaintiffs brought this negligence action against ARS in 2009, alleging that they 
were exposed to high levels of carbon monoxide gas. (R. at 1-11). ARS conceded that it 
was negligent but disputed that the levels of carbon monoxide gas proximately caused 
Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. (R. at 941). Plaintiffs asserted two separate causes of action: 
a simple negligence claim, under which they asserted that ARS is vicariously liable for 
the acts of its employees; and a claim for negligent hiring, training and supervision. (R. 
at 4-7.) Plaintiffs included a request for punitive damages in their Complaint. (R at 4-7.) 
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On March 16, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Finding of Prima Facie Case for 
Punitive Damages Claim, arguing that they had established a prima facie case for 
punitive damages by showing ARS recklessly operated a gas powered pump and that 
ARS knew of or should have known that operating the gas-powered pump would expose 
others to high levels of carbon monoxide. (R. at 392-94, 404-668). ARS opposed 
Plaintiffs' Motion and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages and Plaintiffs' claim for negligent hiring, training, 
and supervision. (R. at 801-975). ARS maintained that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs 
were not entitled to a prima facie finding for their punitive damages claim because they 
could not establish by clear and convincing evidence "actual knowledge" by an ARS 
management-level employee of the danger created. (R. at 817-824, 1423-29). ARS 
further maintained that Plaintiffs' claim for negligent hiring, training, and supervision 
should be barred because it is a concurrent form of negligence to vicarious liability, 
which ARS had already admitted. (R. at 824-26, 1424, 1429-30). 
The district court heard oral argument on the motions on July 22, 2010. (R. at 
1592). On October 1, 2010, the district court entered its Order, in which it denied ARS's 
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Punitive Damages and Second Cause of Action, and 
granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Finding of Prima Facie Case for Punitive Damages Claim. 
(R. at 1479-1484) (also attached hereto as Addendum "3"). The district court ruled that, 
in order to establish a prima facie case of punitive damages, "Plaintiffs do not have to 
prove 'actual knowledge' on the part of [ARS]. It is sufficient for Plaintiffs to show that 
Defendant knew or should have known its conduct would likely result in substantial harm 
ix 
to another." (R. at 1481) (emphasis added). Applying this standard, the district court 
found that Plaintiffs had proven this element by clear and convincing evidence. The 
district court also found that Plaintiffs' second cause of action for negligent hiring, 
training and supervision was not intended to allow Plaintiffs to obtain duplicative 
recovery against ARS, but that it "bears on the question of punitive damages and should, 
therefore, be heard by the jury." (R. at 1482). 
On October 19, 2010, ARS filed a petition for permission to appeal the district 
court's interlocutory Order. (R. at 1485). The Utah Supreme Court transferred ARS's 
petition to this Court on November 2, 2010. This Court granted the petition on 
November 12,2010. (R. at 1591). 
2. Statement of Facts, 
A. Background of Case 
1. This is a personal injury action arising out of carbon monoxide exposure 
that took place on Sunday, June 24, 2007. (R. at 1-11). 
2. On the morning in question, employees at the IHC Clinic in Logan, Utah 
discovered large amounts of water in the basement of the Clinic, which was entering 
from the canal directly abutting the Clinic. They contacted ARS to respond on an 
emergency basis and pump out the water that had flowed into the basement. (R. at 2-3, 
858, and 894). 
3. ARS dispatched its "on-call" crew, consisting of two technicians. The 
technicians arrived at the IHC Clinic at approximately 11:00 a.m. and initially attempted 
to pump out the flood water using its standard "Vortex" Trucks, which are 250-gallon to 
x 
500-gallon capacity suction pumps mounted on the bed of trucks and powered by take 
offs from the truck engine. (R. at 858-63, 894-96, and 898). 
4. The ARS crew included Jess Daines, a senior technician who had worked 
for ARS for five years and had handled hundreds of floods. Mr. Daines was also a 
trained EMT, worked as a part-time fireman with Smithfield City, and had approximately 
900 hours of independent training in related fields, including carbon monoxide exposure 
training. (R. at 841-43, 845-47, and 859). 
5. Mr. Daines was one of ARS's "top flood technicians." (R. at 934). 
6. The second ARS crewmember was Robert Walsh, a technician who was 
newer to the company but likewise had significant construction and flood remediation 
experience, was a Vietnam veteran, and had been employed by the company for 
approximately one and a half years. Prior to joining ARS, Mr. Walsh had over twenty 
years of experience supervising and constructing nuclear submarines. (R. at 879-81). 
7. Mr. Walsh was also more than capable of handling flood remediation work 
and had no prior issues with his work performance. (R. at 934). 
8. Upon arriving at the IHC Clinic, the ARS technicians discovered that the 
sump pump built into the basement of the Clinic had stopped functioning and that water 
was entering the basement so rapidly that the Vortex Trucks could not pump the water 
out of the basement as fast as it was flowing into the Clinic basement. (R. at 859, 861, 
and 895-96). 
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9. The ARS crew then called an ARS project manager, and through the course 
of this discussion, reached the decision to return to ARS's shop and grab a rarely-used, 
large gas-powered pump from the backroom of ARS's shop. (R. at 861-63 and 897-99). 
10. The ARS crew returned to the IHC Clinic at approximately 1:00 p.m. The 
intake hose on the pump was not long enough to reach the basement with the pump 
remaining outside. Concerned about combating the flooding water, the ARS crew 
unfortunately decided to operate the pump inside the basement of the IHC Clinic without 
considering the potential ramifications of the carbon monoxide the engine would emit— 
including the ramifications presented both to themselves and to the IHC Clinic 
employees. (R. at 866, testimony from Mr. Daines that he did not consider that running 
the gas-powered pump in the basement caused a risk of carbon monoxide exposure to 
people in the medical offices; R. at 898-900, and 902, testimony from Mr. Walsh that he 
did not consider that running a gas-powered pump in the basement created a risk of 
carbon monoxide exposure). It is not clear whether the ARS technicians decided to place 
the pump inside the basement with or without direction from the ARS project manager. 
(R. at 863 and 867, testimony from Mr. Daines that no specific instructions as to where to 
place the pump were provided; R. at 932, testimony from Mr. Newmyer that he believes 
he may have stated that if the intake hose would not reach the water, then the pump 
would have to be taken to the basement). 
11. An IHC maintenance person was also present in the basement of the Clinic 
during the time the ARS technicians operated the pump, and he likewise did not think to 
stop running the pump. (R. at 873-74). 
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12. Fire department and other emergency personnel ultimately evacuated the 
building at approximately 4:00 p.m., and some IHC Clinic employees were taken to the 
hospital to be checked for carbon monoxide exposure. The ARS technicians were also 
later instructed to go to the hospital by ARS's president and owner, Judson Eades, to be 
tested. (R. at 872, 900, 902, 942). 
13. All three Plaintiffs were IHC employees who were working in the Clinic 
that day. Their Complaint seeks to recover for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of 
the June 24, 2007 carbon monoxide incident. (R. at 4). 
14. Plaintiffs set forth two causes of action against ARS: (1) a negligence 
claim against ARS based on vicarious liability for the acts of Mr. Daines and Mr. Walsh 
in the course and scope of their employment; and (2) a claim against ARS for negligent 
hiring, training, and supervision of Mr. Daines and Mr. Walsh. (R. at 4-7). 
15. Plaintiffs have sought punitive damages against ARS on these claims. (R. 
at 7). 
B. Background of ARS 
16. ARS is a local Logan company that performs flood and fire remediation 
services and restoration services, including flood water extraction and repairing damages 
caused by floods and fires. (R. at 2). 
17. The president and owner of ARS (technically Adrenalin Enterprises, Inc., 
d/b/a ARS), Mr. Eades, purchased the assets, including equipment, machinery, tools, and 
the ARS d/b/a from the prior owners in July 2006. (R. at 939-40). 
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18 A t the time c f the incident suestion, ARS's management team was 
structured so that there were three estimators/project managers: Jud Eades (also the 
owner), Dan Newmyer, and Jaren Barson. The estimators/project managers would bid 
the jobs, seieci ilu; crews nl laimiuan-. in wnii nn ihe |nlv in make MIFY tint ^inm 
employees would be in charge and help direct and train less experienced employees, train 
the crews on ARS's equipment, and monitor the crews' progress and performance. (R. at 
845-46, 848, 884-86, 915-1 ! , and 958-59). 
19. ARS employs approxi . • - \> work as flood and fire 
remediation technicians, laborers, construction carpenters. c:c. [K at 944). 
20. ARS owns and generally uses Vortex Trucks, revered as one ^f ; . ^e*f 
types of extract! on equipmen I in tin/ lloml remedial ium industi). to respi 
( -••' , • - \ urtex trucks, together with certain specialized drying fans and 
humidifiers, are what ARS uses in virtually all of its jobs. (R. at 953). 
21. The gas-powered pump in question was purchased h\ ARS as part ol the 
pump had been used by ARS because water levels rarely reach a level deep enough to 
warrant the maintenance and difficulties associated with operating the pump. In fact, the 
22. ARS did not have any prior incidents involving carbon monoxide exposure, 
and on the three prior occasions ARS's project manager could recall the gas-powered 
xi \ 
pump being used, the pump was operated outdoors twice and once in a vacant home. (R. 
at 927-28 and 951-52). 
23. Because ARS is relatively small, its management and employees are very 
familiar with one another. ARS's management has a personal relationship with each of 
its employees. It tracks the jobs each employee performs, knows the skill sets of each 
employee, knows each employee's strengths and weaknesses, and monitors its 
employees' performances without the formality of a much larger corporation. Because of 
this knowledge, ARS can ensure that an employee is not sent out to handle a job alone 
without proper training and knowledge. (R. at 958-59). 
24. ARS trained, educated, and instructed each of its technicians on how to 
operate and safely use the Vortex trucks and all of the other equipment that its employees 
regularly used to extract water. Specifically, ARS had a company policy that crews 
would be staffed with senior-level, experienced technicians who would provide lesser 
experienced technicians with training on techniques, operation of equipment, and safety 
matters. The senior technicians would then report back to the project managers regarding 
the progress of the job and the performance of the crew members. (R. at 845-49, 884-86, 
888-89, 915-16, 918, 947, 953, 959). 
2
 Mr. Newmyer began working for ARS in 2000 and was employed as an estimator and 
project manager both before and after the change of ownership in 2006. (R. at 914-15 
and 933-34). His recollection of the instances when the pump was used refers to his 
employment before the ownership change, which was verified by Mr. Eades' testimony 
that the pump was never used under ARS's current ownership prior to June 24, 2007. (R. 
at 947). 
xv 
monthly "in the shop" training meetings occurring before crews were dispatched. (R. at 
948). ARS's project managers and more experienced technicians perform presentations 
for the entire ARS technician staff on equipment usage, equipment set up, re n lediati :»ii 
out-of-state training courses offered by national flood and fire remediation organizations, 
and then has those employees hold a training session to communicate the items learned to 
the ( ^ ^iv> . nployees. (R al 848 i ind 945-48) 
26. ARS also uses "paycheck notes," which are memoranda stapled to 
employee paychecks, to communicate reminders or to provide direction to employees. 
(R. at 966). 
C. ARS Apology 
27. Jud Eades, testifying in his capacity as ARS's Rule 30(b)(6) representative, 
testified that ARS accepted liability for the carbon monoxide exposure, that it sincerely 
apologized for any allegedinjuri.es caused , bi it that this vv as an honest accident: 
j t w a s suc^ a _ y 0 U j m o W 5 a n honest accident that they [the ARS technicians] did, . 
. .What you're going to hear from me and what > ou heard from them is what 
happened and, you knov>, we feel real sorry about what happened. We made an 
honest mistake and I 'm willing to talk about it and get this resolved and hopefully 
move on with it and get these gals taken care of. 
(R a i .94 1 ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1 'he district court's Order directly contradicts the holding in Daniels v. Gumma 
We st Brachytheraj iy, LLC 2009 1 T 1 66, ""j | 11 221 P 3d 256 11 alsc > runs : •< >ntran < t< > 
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Utah's punitive damages statute, which imposes the burden to prove—by clear and 
convincing evidence—that ARS acted willfully, intentionally fraudulently, or 
maliciously; or with a knowing and reckless indifference and disregard toward the rights 
of others. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a). Despite the clear language of this 
statute and the Daniels decision, the district court found that Plaintiffs established a prima 
facie case for punitive damages by merely showing that "[ARS] knew or should have 
known its conduct would likely result in substantial harm to another[.]" (R. at 1481). 
The district court erred in applying a standard for a prima facie case of punitive damages 
that did not require proof that ARS had actual knowledge of the danger its conduct 
created. 
The district court also erred in basing its prima facie finding of punitive damages 
on the conduct of any ARS employee, as opposed to conduct of a managerial agent. 
Punitive damages may not be imposed upon an employer for the conduct of an employee 
unless there was some wrongful act by a managerial agent of the employer. Hodges v. 
Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 1991); Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 
778 (Utah 1988). The district court, however, came to its conclusion regardless of 
"[wjhether the individuals involved were technicians, supervisors, or other employees." 
(R. at 1481). By not requiring a showing of knowing and reckless conduct on the part of 
a managerial-level employee, the district erred and misapprehended the standard for 
imposing punitive damages upon an employer under Utah law. 
Last, the district court also erred in allowing Plaintiffs to proceed against ARS on 
their negligent employment claims. ARS admits that its employees acted within the 
xvii 
coin sti and M'tipe of"their rmplmmerit ami is prepared tn innir \ iriirious Ha bilit\ for their 
negligent conduct. Because vicarious liability and negligent employment are concurrent 
forms of negligence, when one is established, the other becomes cumulative and 
and scope of till i : ir em plo> iiieiit,, Plaintiffs' negligent employment claims became 
obsolete. The district court erred in denying ARS's motion for summary judgment with 
regard to these claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE PROOF 
OF "ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE" TO RECOVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
A R.S" s action s constitute simple negligence ' I he fa cts here do 11 : ill: j : resent a n 
extreme case where the alleged behavior of the defendant is so wanton and reprehensible 
that it causes "outrage" and warrants punitive damages. To the contrary, the alleged 
injuries in this case resulted from an unfortunate mistake. :\<>i irons intent, malice, ill \\ III, 
or a knowing and reckless disregard of the rights < • - \"" -v\ -;r regrettable inji n } • 
Plaintiffs suffered, their legal recourse is compensatory damages, not punishment upon 
ARS in the form of punitive damages. 
prima facie case for punitive damages, the district court stated that "the Plaintiffs do not 
have to prove "actual knowledge' on the part , f !l . Defendant T4 '- sufficient fjr 
Plaintiffs to show that Defendant knew or shojic n a ^ K:.. .*: . \ , . _ , . . . 
resin ill: In substantial harm I: : another " (E v \ Thi<; . \s * ? -
1 
language in the punitive damages statute and recent precedent. As discussed below, 
Plaintiffs may only recover punitive damages if they prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that ARS had actual knowledge; mere negligence will not suffice. In light of 
this rule, and combined with the complete lack of evidence that ARS acted knowingly, 
the district court's order should be overturned and summary judgment should be granted 
to ARS. 
A. Plaintiffs Must Prove Actual Knowledge by Clear and Convincing 
Evidence. 
Utah's Punitive Damages Statute strictly limits punitive damages to cases where 
"it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or 
conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, 
the rights of others." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a). The Utah Supreme Court has 
directed that under the plain language of the punitive damages statute, a plaintiff must 
show one of two types of conduct to support a claim for punitive damages: (1) "willful 
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct" or (2) "a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others." Daniels v. Gamma West 
Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, f 41, 221 P.3d 256 {citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-
201(l)(a)) (emphasis added). Not even mere notice or knowledge of a dangerous 
condition and a failure to act, absent more, justify an award of punitive damages. Orr v. 
Brigham Young University, 960 F.Supp. 1522, 1531 (D. Utah 1994). 
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punitive damages standard requires a plaintiff to prove "actual knowledge" on the part of 
a defendant by clear and convincing evidence. There, a hospital patient sued his 
physician when he suffered troiu a severe mftxtjou ihdl allV'Liuih lesiilied Iron radial nun 
tvHlnu.Mil perl on in it d b\ the physician ?l)0c> HI 66, at Y\\ ^"y- ^ i e patient sought to 
recover punitive damages based on gross negligence On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court determined whether the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment for the 
intentional conduct. Id at ^ 39. Ilie Daniels court held that the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment because "[t]o qualify for punitive damages under the statute, 
an action need . / . intentional but may alternate, -L .. . sing and reckless," I < i 
(emphasis add*.- : 
In reaching this conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court specifically identified the 
type of proof required to recover punitive damages under the "knowing and reckless" 
standard: 
j 0 p r o v e that a tortfeasor's actions were knowing and reckless, a party 
must prove that the tortfeasor knew of a substantial risk and proceeded to 
act or failed to act while consciously ignoring that risk. Recklessness 
includes conduct where "the actor knfewl, or ha[d] reason to know, , of 
facts which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to another, and 
deliberately proceeds to act. or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or 
indifference to, that risk." 
Id. at ^ 42 (emphasis added). 
In applying this standard to the facts, the Daniels court expressly stated that proof 
ihiil n defenduni should h;n : Lnr.vrf ol ihc daniiei if:ak\'i h\ its conduct is insufficient 
for the purpose of punitive damages: "While all gross negligence claimants can 
automatically claim recklessness, only some may be able to show that a tortfeasor 
actually knew of the danger of his or her inaction, as opposed to should have known of 
the danger." Id. at TJ 44. The court concluded that the patient "must prove that [the 
doctor] knew of the danger presented" by the treatment and was indifferent to the 
outcome to recover punitive damages. Id. The court remanded the case to the trial court 
and directed it to determine whether the doctor's conduct was "both knowing and 
reckless." Id. at^|45. 
Prior to the enactment of Utah's punitive damages statute in 1989, Utah courts 
were left to create a standard for awarding such damages on their own. For example, in 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that punitive damages could be awarded in the absence of a statute that expressly 
provides for such damages. The court found the broad language of the wrongful death 
statute at the time permitted the recovery of punitive damages in certain cases. Id. at 
1186. Citing to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and to a Wyoming Supreme Court 
decision, the Behrens court held that "the defendant must either know or should know" 
that its conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to 
another. Id. at 1187 (quoting Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979).3 
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 Behrens also established that punitive damages may generally only be awarded on proof 
of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that manifests a "knowing and reckless" 
indifference towards the rights of others. 675 P.2d at 1186. The Utah Supreme Court 
was also clear that punitive damages are an infrequent remedy that should not be awarded 
for simple negligence. Id. 
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Plaintiffs ha\e I used 'kj"'i .ugunicut1' In! pimitiu1 Jtiinji.»t> on Rehrew1 "«IHI ill 'i 
Utah cases that have cited to Behrens for the proposition that punitive damages may be 
awarded under a mere "knew or should have known" standard. However, the Behrens 
standard was intentionally amended by .... ,iah legislature i n 1989., w hen it drafted and 
The Utah Supreme Court recently took note of this in Daniels, observing that, the 
legislature's addition of the "knowing" hurdle was purposeful and specifically required 
the plain lift b1n punc actual knowledge b\ (he defendant of (he diiiiiiiT crcalnd IT ik 
defendant's conduct." 2009 u I 66, at Tj 42 (quoting Utah Senate Journal, 48th Leg., Gen. 
Sess. 705 (Feb. 21, 1989) (statement of Sen. Barlow)) (emphasis added). 
In the present action, Plaintiffs have not fbcusea ;.,;... . » :*:* on w hether AR S" 's 
cond "i IC I: w as "v illfi il and ma licious or in tentionally f nstead contend that 
ARS's conduct fits within the "knowing and reckless" portion of the punitive damages 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a). Instead of requiring Plaintiffs to prove 
t\.- .^ ^ possessed, a ctiial kno w ledge of the • danger ci eate d !i; • Its c ondi ict the distr ict 
court only required Plaintiffs to prove "[ARS] knew or should have known its conduct 
would likely result in substantial harm \o another" to establish a prima facie ease that a 
punitive damages award is reasonably likel} (R at 1481). 
1 he district court erre :i i n not reqi ii ri iig Pla intiffs to prove that ARS's conduct was 
knowing and reckless in order to avoid summary judgment on the punitive damages 
claim... Instead5 the district court found that a prima facie case for punitive damages was 
established by applying the incorrect standard. The district court's order should therefore 
be dismissed. 
B. The District Court Improperly Applied a Simple Negligence Standard. 
Utah courts have repeatedly emphasized, even before enactment of the punitive 
damages statute, that simple negligence can never serve as the basis for an award of 
punitive damages. See Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186 ("Simple negligence will never suffice 
as a basis upon which [punitive] damages may be awarded.'5); Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
Inc., 2003 UT 41, f 27, 82 P.3d 1064 ("[Sjimple negligence will not support punitive 
damages . . . .") (quoting Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, % 29, 63 
P.3d 686); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 P.2d 660, 670 
(Utah 1988) (u[E]vidence of simple negligence alone does not support an award of 
punitive damages."); see also Boyette v. L.W. Looney & Son, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1344, 
1349 (D. Utah 1996) ("An award of punitive damages may not be predicated solely upon 
a finding of ordinary negligence."); In re Lang, 293 B.R. 501, 519 (10th Cir. BAP 2003) 
("Ordinary negligence will not support an award of punitive damages.") (citing Boyette). 
Not even gross negligence, by itself, is a sufficient basis for imposing punitive damages 
liability. Daniels, 2009 UT 66, at fflf 43-44 (explaining that gross negligence is equated 
with reckless disregard, but punitive damages requires a showing of actual knowledge). 
"Something more than a commission of a tort is always required for punitive 
damages." Boyette, 932 F. Supp. at 1350 (citations omitted). "Punitive damages are not 
awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like, which constitute 
ordinary negligence." Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186 (quoting Restatements (Second) of 
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1 ? - ' (citation omitted). Instead, an award of punitive damages is ow- iustified *or 
"highly unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from ordinary care, r i situation 
where a high degree of danger i s apparent," Behrens, 6' / 5 P 2d. at 11 v-> " (quoting 
personal injury cases, it is the extreme, outrageous and shocking behavior that justifies 
their impositio " .z-.-V K Rogers. nf>3 ? 2f nn" nnf Ttah 1Q$SN r.~r *v* 
reason, courts i. .. .•< ..; :™. 
similar to that usually found : ::•"•-..-/" ±a. ai i5t9 n. ; (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §908 cmt. b). 
The Utah Coui\ * i \ppeals recently reaffirmed that much more than a showing of 
i . "-c^-* - l " ' mmar> jn; ldgmen 1: ! : n a pun iti\ e da ma ges 
claim. Nguyen v. IHCHealth Services, Inc., 2010 UT App 85, 232 P.3d 529. That case 
involved a medical malpractice action. Id, at Yf 2-3. A one-year old child was admitted 
to Primary Children's hospital and died af tei the staff pla ce d the child on an untes ted 
transport ventilator and the battery died. Id. The plaintiff set forth evidence that the 
ventilator was an untested sales model on loan to the hospital, staff did not follow proper 
protocol, staft ... . not consu1, :.- medical team prior to placing the child on the 
ventilator. Id. at \ 11. While recognizing that these facts could prove simple negligence, 
the Court found, "as a matter of law," that they could not "justify a punitive damages 
aw ard because tiie> w ould not establish that [the hospital's] actions amount 
: 
that manifested] a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the 
rights of others.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a)). 
Even under the grossest distortion of the facts in this case, ARS's actions do not 
meet the extreme standard required for an assessment of punitive damages. There is no 
evidence that ARS operated the gas-powered pump with knowledge or intent to expose 
Plaintiffs to carbon monoxide. In fact, the ARS technicians worked in the IHC Clinic 
basement all day right next to the gas-powered pump, directly exposing themselves to the 
carbon monoxide emissions, as well. (R. at 866 and 898). ARS's conduct was—at 
most—an error of judgment, not a knowing and reckless indifference to Plaintiffs' safety. 
This is a case of simple negligence, and the district court applied only a negligence 
standard in finding a prima facie case for punitive damages. 
C. There is no Evidence that ARS Acted Knowingly. 
When "assessing whether [a party] has made a sufficient showing to withstand 
summary judgment," the United States Supreme Court and Utah courts have instructed 
that district courts must "take into account 'the substantive evidentiary standard of proof 
that would apply at a trial on the merits.'" Christiansen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
2006 UT App 180, *{ 6, 136 P.3d 1266 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 
242, 252 (1986)); see also Andalex Res., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) ("In granting a motion for summary judgment, a trial judge must consider 
each element of the claim under the appropriate standard of proof). Clear and 
convincing proof is the standard that applies to Plaintiffs' punitive damages claims. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a). 
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"Clear and convincing proof clinches what might be otherwise only probable to 
the mind [F]or a matter to be clear and convincing to a particular mind it must at 
least have reached the point where there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the 
correctness of the conclusion." Boyette, 932 F. Supp. at 1347 (D. Utah 1996) (rejecting 
punitive damages claim) (quoting Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 204 (Utah 1949)) 
(emphasis in original). Thus, to submit punitive damages to a jury, Plaintiffs bore the 
heightened burden at the summary judgment stage to show that no serious or substantial 
doubt remained that ARS "knowingly and recklessly disregarded" their safety. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a). This heightened standard of proof is fatal to Plaintiffs' 
punitive damage claim.4 
Plaintiffs failed entirely to satisfy the knowing prong by clear and convincing 
evidence as required under Utah law. Their punitive damages claim rested entirely on 
assertions that ARS should have been aware that operating the gas-powered pump would 
ultimately lead to the carbon monoxide incident at the IHC Clinic. A post hoc review of 
the incident, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight vision, is inappropriate for a punitive 
damages analysis. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence that the ARS crew or 
the ARS project estimator was consciously aware at the time that the gas-powered engine 
4
 Whenever there is no clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with a 
"knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others," a 
court should rule, as a matter of law, that a punitive damages claim should be dismissed. 
Boyette, 932 F. Supp. at 1347-50 (dismissing punitive damages claim because reasonable 
jury could not find by clear and convincing evidence that defendant's conduct constituted 
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others); Orr, 
960 F. Supp. at 1530-31 (granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs punitive damage 
claim based on insufficient evidence that defendant had knowledge). 
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would actually pose a danger to those on the floor above, then made the conscious 
decision to disregard that risk and move forward with operating the pump. 
As established by the Daniels court, the "knowing" prong of Utah's punitive 
damages standard requires the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence "actual 
knowledge by the defendant of the danger created by the defendant's conduct." Daniels, 
2009 UT at \ 42. "A party must prove that the tortfeasor knew of a substantial risk and 
proceeded to act or failed to act while consciously ignoring that risk." Id. Applied to this 
case, Plaintiffs must prove that the ARS technicians had actual knowledge that the gas-
powered pump emitted carbon monoxide fumes, that prolonged exposure to such fumes 
could be dangerous, and that operating the pump in the basement of the Clinic could 
result in prolonged exposure to carbon monoxide to individuals in the upper levels of the 
Clinic. Plaintiffs have failed to present such evidence. 
Attempting to sidestep their inability to demonstrate that ARS acted with actual 
knowledge, Plaintiffs presented evidence consisting almost exclusively of literature and 
testimony from their own expert concerning the dangers associated with carbon 
monoxide exposure.5 (R. at 414-20). Recitations of these dangers did not establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that ARS possessed actual knowledge that running the 
5
 Plaintiffs also cited to the deposition transcripts of several ARS employees in an attempt 
to demonstrate that ARS was aware of these dangers at the time of the incident. These 
citations, however, were taken out of context and did nothing more than establish that the 
ARS employees acknowledged the potential for carbon monoxide problems with gas-
powered engines after the incident. {See R. at 417, 419-20, 468-70, 500-01, and 949-50). 
The only citation referring to ARS's knowledge before the incident was to Mr. Eades' 
deposition that he had a basic understanding of carbon monoxide before the accident. 
{See R. at 419 and 950). 
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gas-powered pump would pose a safety threat to those present in the building, considered 
that threat, and then consciously disregarded the danger. In fact, Plaintiffs' lengthy 
factual averments provided nothing more than a broad discussion of the general 
information regarding the general dangers of carbon monoxide gas. Noticeably absent 
from the record is any testimony or other evidence that ARS was aware of or previously 
encountered such a danger from prior experience such that it would have actual 
knowledge. 
What the record contains is evidence that the ARS crew operating the pump did 
not have actual knowledge of the danger posed to others by their conduct. (R. at 865-66, 
898-900, and 902). The fact that they remained indoors next to the pump while it was 
operated and exposed themselves to carbon monoxide emissions substantiates their 
testimony on this matter. The record also shows that ARS's managers were not aware of 
the threat of carbon monoxide poisoning to their employees or to others in the IHC clinic 
while the pump was being operated. (R. at 932-33). Plaintiffs failed to present any 
evidence to rebut this testimony or to demonstrate that ARS, its managers or its 
employees possessed actual knowledge of the danger to Plaintiffs created by operating 
the gas-powered pump in the basement of the IHC Clinic. 
The undisputed evidence showed that ARS never experienced any prior issues 
with carbon monoxide exposure from any source, whether it be its own equipment or 
otherwise. The undisputed evidence further showed that ARS did not act with any ill 
intent or actual knowledge or that it consciously disregarded a known risk. The district 
court erred in finding that Plaintiffs satisfied their clear and convincing evidentiary 
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burden and in refusing to grant summary judgment to ARS on Plaintiffs' punitive 
damages claims. 
H. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT REQUIRE KNOWING AND 
RECKLESS CONDUCT BY A MANAGERIAL-LEVEL EMPLOYEE. 
It is uncertain from the Order whether the district court applied the facts of this 
case to Plaintiffs' claims for vicarious liability, or whether the facts were applied to 
Plaintiffs' second cause of action for negligent hiring, training, and supervision when it 
found Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of punitive damages. The lack of 
clarity with regard to which cause of action the court based its prima facie finding is 
significant due to the specific proof required to sustain punitive damages against an 
employer for the actions of its employees. 
Regardless of which cause of action the district court used as a basis for its 
decision, it improperly applied a standard that did not require proof of knowing and 
reckless conduct by an ARS managerial-level employee. For this reason, it erred in 
finding a prima facie case of punitive damages without requiring evidence of knowing 
and reckless conduct by an ARS managerial-level employee. 
A. Plaintiffs Must Show a Wrongful Act was Committed by a Managerial 
Agent to Recover Punitive Damages Based on Vicarious Liability. 
Liability for punitive damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior may only 
arise under certain conditions. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 
1991). For such damages to be awarded against an employer for the act of an employee, 
one of the following must be true: 
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(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner 
of the act, or 
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless 
in employing or retaining him, or 
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the 
scope of employment, or 
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved 
the act. 
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 1991) (adopting the 
Restatement's "complicity rule"). Each of these scenarios explicitly requires "some 
wrongful action" on the part of a managerial-level employee before punitive damages 
may be imposed on an employer on the basis of vicarious liability. Johnson v. Rogers, 
763 P.2d 771, 778 (Utah 1988). 
The district court based its prima facie finding of punitive damages on the 
"knowing and reckless" portion of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a). (R. at 1480-81) 
(discussing proof required to establish the "knowledge" element). In the context of this 
action, the "wrongful action" would be actual knowledge by ARS of the danger created 
by its conduct. Daniels, 2009 UT 66, at f 42. Because punitive damages liability only 
attaches if there is "wrongful action" by a managerial-level employee, ARS could only be 
liable for the act of an employee if a managerial agent knew that the flood remediation 
services provided to the IHC clinic posed a risk of carbon monoxide exposure to the 
inhabitants of the building. 
Despite this requirement, the district court found that the punitive damages 
standard was satisfied as follows: 
The Court finds, however, that the gas powered pump which was used in 
this case and which lead to the carbon monoxide poisoning had an explicit 
13 
warning. Whether the individuals involved were technicians, supervisors, 
or other employees, the pump itself indicated that it shouldn't be operated 
in a closed environment. 
(R. at 1481) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly stated that an 
employer may not be liable for punitive damages absent some wrongful action on the part 
of a managerial-level employee. However, the district court appears to have based its 
prima facie finding of punitive damages on the conduct of any ARS employee, regardless 
of whether the employee was managerial-level or not, by generalizing its prima facie 
finding on the conduct of "technicians, supervisors, or other employees." (Id.) 
While the district court did not clearly identify for which of Plaintiffs' causes of 
actions it based its finding that a prima facie case for punitive damages had been 
established, the language in the Order suggests that it was premised upon vicarious 
liability.6 If the prima facie finding that a punitive damages award is reasonably likely is 
based on vicarious liability, the district court erred in not requiring proof of wrongful 
conduct on the part of a managerial-level employee. Therefore, the Order should be 
remanded for further clarification, with directions that it be reversed in its entirety if it 
was based on vicarious liability for negligent acts of employees. 
6
 The Order focuses on ARS's operation of the gas-powered pump and whether it "knew 
or should have known" that this conduct would likely result in substantial harm to 
another. (R. at 1480-81). There is no mention within the Order of the manner in which 
ARS's employees were hired, trained, and/or supervised. This language suggests that the 
district court was concerned with the actions of an employee, and not with how ARS's 
management hired, trained or supervised its employees. 
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B. Even if the District Court's Decision was Based on Plaintiffs' Negligent 
Employment Claims, the Conclusion Reached Still Required Knowing 
and Reckless Conduct by ARS Management 
Even if the prima facie finding was premised upon Plaintiffs' claims for negligent 
hiring, training, and supervision, the district court's decision is still erroneous. In order to 
n 
prevail on a negligent employment claim under Utah law, a plaintiff must show that the 
employer knew or should have known the employee posed a foreseeable risk of imposing 
some harm on the plaintiff, that the employee in fact inflicted the harm, and that the 
employer's negligence in hiring, supervising, or retaining the employee proximately 
caused the injury. Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 
P.2d 949, 973 (Utah 1992). 
When applied to punitive damages claims based on negligent employment causes 
of action, the plaintiff must prove that the employer was either "willful and malicious or 
intentionally fraudulent" or "knowing and reckless." See Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance 
Corp., 2004 UT 59, ffif 44-46, 96 P.3d 893 {quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a) 
and upholding punitive damages award for the failure to properly train employees 
because of the employer's "knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard 
of," the plaintiffs rights). 
In this case, punitive damages may only be imposed on ARS for claims of 
negligent employment if ARS's hiring, training and/or supervision of the crew that 
7
 Causes of action termed "negligent hiring," "negligent supervision," and "negligent 
retention" are all considered basic subsets of negligent employment law. Retherford, 844 
P.2dat973n.l5. 
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responded to the IHC clinic flood manifested a knowing and reckless disregard of 
Plaintiffs5 rights. Obviously, this would require "actual knowledge" of the danger 
created to Plaintiffs on the part of an ARS managerial agent in charge of hiring, training, 
and/or supervising the ARS employees. However, the district court came to its 
conclusion regardless of "[wjhether the individuals involved were technicians, 
supervisors, or other employees[.]" (R. at 1481). The district court did not even mention 
whether ARS, as an employer, knowingly and recklessly employed workers who posed a 
foreseeable risk to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding that 
Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that a punitive damages award is reasonably 
likely under either of Plaintiffs' causes of action. 
HI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
NEGLIGENT EMPLOYMENT CAUSE OF ACTION DESPITE ARS'S 
ADMISSION OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY. 
A. The Majority of Jurisdictions Do Not Permit a Plaintiff to Pursue 
Other Theories of Negligence Against an Employer if the Employer 
Admits Vicarious Liability. 
The majority of jurisdictions agree that it is improper to allow a plaintiff to 
proceed against an employer on theories of negligent hiring, training, or supervision if the 
employer has admitted that its employee was acting within the course and scope of its 
employment when the accident occurred. Wise v. Fiberglass Systems, Inc., 718 P.2d 
1178, 1181-82 (Idaho 1986); McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. 1995); see 
also Coville v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 817 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) ("It is 
well-settled law that '[w]here an employee is acting within the scope of his or her 
employment, the employer is liable under the theory of respondeat superior and no claim 
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may proceed against the employer for negligent hiring or retention'"). While some 
jurisdictions allow plaintiffs to proceed with negligent employment claims after vicarious 
liability is admitted, those jurisdictions concede that they follow the minority view. See 
Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1223 (Kan. 1998); Poplin v. 
Bestway Express, 286 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1320 (M.D. Ala. 2003); Fairshter v. American 
Nat. Red Cross, 322 F.Supp.2d 646, 654 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
The reasoning behind the majority view is that vicarious liability and negligent 
employment are concurrent forms of negligence; when one is proven, the other becomes 
obsolete and unnecessary because "the liability of the employer is fixed by the amount of 
liability of the employee." McHqffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826. One court explained the 
purpose of the rule as follows: 
The doctrine of respondeat superior and the doctrine of negligent 
entrustment are simply alternative theories by which to impute an 
employee's negligence to an employer. Under either theory, the liability of 
the principal is dependent on the negligence of the agent. If it is not 
disputed that the employee's negligence is to be imputed to the employer, 
there is no need to prove that the employer is liable. Once the principal has 
admitted its liability under a respondeat superior theory, such as in the 
instant case, the cause of action for negligent [employment] is duplicative 
and unnecessary. 
Gant v. L.U. Transport, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (111. Ct. App. 2002). Thus, a 
plaintiff who is entitled to recover damages suffered through an employee's negligence 
should not be allowed to proceed with negligent employment claims against the employer 
because "[h]e can have no greater right and is entitled to no greater recovery by showing 
[negligent employment]." Willis v. Hill, 159 S.E.2d 145, 157 (Ga. App. 1967), rev'd on 
unrelated grounds, 161 S.E.2d281 (Ga. 1968). 
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ARS is unaware of any Utah appellate court decision on this issue. The Utah 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that an employer can be directly liable for its acts and 
omissions in hiring and supervising its employees and can be held vicariously liable for 
an employee's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. J.H. By and Through 
D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 124 (Utah 1992); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 
808 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Utah 1991).8 While these courts recognize direct liability for 
negligent employment claims, they did not decide whether a defendant may be liable for 
both negligent employment and for the negligent act of an employee if vicarious liability 
has been admitted.9 
The elements required by Utah courts to prove these claims suggest that Utah 
would follow the majority rule. Utah law requires a plaintiff to show that an employee 
The only rule to be inferred from these decisions is that an employer may be liable even 
if its employee was not acting within the course and scope of their employment. The 
same rule exists in jurisdictions following the majority approach. See McHaffie, 891 
S.W.2d at 825 (negligent entrustment theory "permits imputation of negligence without 
requiring a finding that the employee was acting in the course or scope of employment"). 
The pronouncement made by the West Valley City and Clover courts was important 
because those cases dealt with employees engaged in actions outside the scope of 
employment. See 840 P.2d at 123 (police officer sexually molesting juvenile); 808 P.2d 
at 1048 (ski resort employee taking dangerous jump for pleasure instead of immediately 
returning to station). Even though the employers in those cases could not be held 
vicariously liable for the conduct of their employees, they could still be liable to the 
plaintiffs under theories of negligent employment. 
9
 Courts adopting the majority view often refer to negligent employment claims as claims 
that impose direct liability. Scroggins v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 928, 
931 (E.D. Term. 2000). The use of this term means only that liability flows directly, 
without having to establish liability through an employee in the course and scope of 
employment. Those courts recognize that there is no need to litigate claims for direct 
liability when vicarious liability has already been admitted because both claims are 
concurrent forms of negligence. Id. 
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inflicted harm before the employer can be held liable for negligent hiring, training or 
supervision. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 973. Similarly, courts following the majority 
approach require the alleged harm to be inflicted by an employee. Gant, 770 N.E.2d at 
1158. 
These courts do not, however, permit a plaintiff to recover under both theories of 
negligence because each is predicated upon the same conduct of the employee. Id. Once 
the employer admits to vicarious liability, it becomes strictly liable for the conduct of its 
employee, and the other negligence causes of action that seek to impose the same level of 
liability on the employer no longer serve a purpose. McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826. For 
that reason, the majority of courts are instructed to grant summary judgment on negligent 
employment claims when vicarious liability is admitted. See Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 131 Cal. App. 4th 845, 872 (2005) (finding trial court erred in denying summary 
judgment motion after vicarious liability was admitted); Williams v. McCollister, 671 
F.Supp.2d 884, 889 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (affirming partial summary judgment to employer 
that admitted vicarious liability). 
In this action, ARS conceded its employees were acting within the course and 
scope of employment. (R. at 941). By making such an acknowledgement, ARS 
subjected itself to vicarious liability for the conduct of its employees and, as a result, 
precluded Plaintiffs from pursuing their concurrent negligence claims based on negligent 
hiring, training and supervision. Instead of granting summary judgment in ARS's favor 
for these claims, the district court incorrectly permitted Plaintiffs to proceed with their 
negligent employment claims, finding that they were not "intended to allow Plaintiffs to 
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obtain duplicative recovery" and that they bear "on the question of punitive damages[.]" 
(R. at 1482). 
B. The Court Erred in Permitting Plaintiffs to Continue with their 
Negligent Employment Cause of Action Even if it was Maintained to 
Pursue Punitive Damages Claims. 
The only exception to the rule described above arises when negligent hiring, 
training or supervision claims are maintained to pursue punitive damages claims. This 
exception to the general rule, however, does not apply when the punitive damages claims 
are dismissed. Coville v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 817 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2006) (dismissing plaintiffs claims for negligent hiring and retention where 
defendant admitted vicarious liability and the facts alleged were insufficient to impose 
punitive damages). 
Because recovery for punitive damages generally requires showing a high degree 
of moral culpability and much more than just simple carelessness, negligent hiring, 
training or supervision claims will be dismissed when none of the factual allegations 
asserted rise to the level of imposing punitive damages. Id. (dismissing plaintiffs claims 
for negligent hiring and retention where defendant admitted vicarious liability and the 
facts alleged were insufficient to impose punitive damages). As previously discussed, 
Utah law requires plaintiffs to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant 
acted willfully, intentionally fraudulently, maliciously, or with a knowing and reckless 
indifference and disregard toward the rights of others before punitive damages may be 
awarded. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l)(a). Plaintiffs failed to meet this 
evidentiary burden. 
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The district court's misapprehension of Utah's punitive damages statute has 
extended to its refusal to grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs' second cause of action. 
Because the facts alleged by Plaintiffs were insufficient to impose punitive damages, 
Plaintiffs' claims for negligent hiring, training, and supervision are concurrent to their 
claim arising out of the employees' negligence. As a result, the exception does not apply 
to Plaintiffs' second cause of action, meaning that it is barred as a matter of law. Thus, 
the district court erred in denying ARS's motion for summary judgment with regards to 
Plaintiffs' second cause of action on the basis that it related to the claims for punitive 
damages. 
C. Severe Prejudice May Result if Plaintiffs are Permitted to Pursue a 
Concurrent Form of Negligence. 
Courts have identified a number of hardships that may befall an employer if the 
plaintiff is permitted to pursue claims for both vicarious liability and for negligent 
employment after the employer has admitted that its employee acted within the course 
and scope of employment. One of the principal concerns is that "unnecessary, irrelevant, 
and inflammatory" evidence would be presented to the jury if negligent employment 
claims are not dismissed even though liability is already conceded. Willis v. Hill, 159 
S.E.2d 145, 157 (Ga. App. 1967), rev'd on unrelated grounds, 161 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 
1968). Because these claims would be a duplicative form of liability and the need to 
prove them would be unnecessary, courts fear that their exclusive purpose would be to 
serve as "instruments] of prejudice." Id. 
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Another worry is that the energy and time of courts and litigants will be 
unnecessarily expended when negligent employment claims are permitted to continue 
under these circumstances. McHqffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826. As with the concern of 
needlessly admitting harmful irrelevant evidence, this preoccupation is centered in the 
notion that litigation on a claim that is concurrent to a claim that has already been 
admitted is an unnecessary waste of time and resources. Id. (finding evidence on 
negligent employment claims "serves no real purpose" when imputation of negligence is 
admitted). 
Courts have also recognized that allowing a plaintiff to pursue negligent 
employment claims after vicarious liability is admitted may lead to inconsistent 
assessments of fault by the jury. The Gant court explained this concern by focusing on 
the principle that an employer's percentage of fault is the same as, and cannot be more 
than, the fault attributed to the employee. See 770 N.E.2d at 1159 ("Although negligent 
entrustment may establish independent fault on the part of the employer, it should not 
impose additional liability on the employer."). This is because the employer's liability is 
predicated on, and entirely derivative of, the negligence of the employee. Id. However, 
if the plaintiff is permitted to pursue two concurrent theories of negligence, it is possible 
that a jury could attribute a greater percentage of fault to the employer than is attributable 
to the employee, an outcome that is "plainly illogical." Therefore, the court held that an 
admission of vicarious liability extinguishes negligent employment claims because "[t]he 
fault of one party cannot be assessed twice[.]" Id. at 1160. 
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ARS has conceded vicarious liability for the actions of its crewmembers. (R. at 
941). Thus, liability is no longer an issue. Plaintiffs' negligent hiring, training, and 
supervision claims are superfluous and unnecessary. The sole purpose of these claims 
now would be to attempt to prejudice ARS, either through the admission of harmful and 
irrelevant evidence, or by requiring it to needlessly expend additional time and resources 
on litigation. Moreover, allowing Plaintiffs to continue with their negligent employment 
claims carries the risk of attributing more fault to ARS than is allowable. Plaintiffs are 
entitled to one recovery for their damages, and Plaintiffs will obtain that recovery from 
ARS by way of vicarious liability. Their negligent training and supervision claims 
should have been dismissed by the district court. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing, ARS requests that the district court's finding of a prima 
facie case for punitive damages be reversed, and that this Court remand to the district 
court with directions to grant ARS's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' 
punitive damages claim and second cause of action. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 2011. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
John R. Lund 
Levi J. Clegg 
Nathan R. Skeen 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART II. ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
CHAPTER 18. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
•••§ 78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards—Section inapplicable to DUI 
cases—Division of award with state 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded only 
if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful 
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of Subsection 
(1) (a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor's 
operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while voluntarily intoxicated or under the 
influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 
41-6a-502. 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding shoplifting 
is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general damages under Subsection 
(1) (a) whether or not restitution has been paid to the merchant prior to or as a part 
of a civil action under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible only after 
a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(a) Discovery concerning a party's wealth or financial condition may only be allowed 
after the party seeking punitive damages has established a prima facie case on the record 
that an award of punitive damages is reasonably likely against the party about whom 
discovery is sought and, if disputed, the court is satisfied that the discovery is not 
sought for the purpose of harassment. 
(b) Subsection (2) (a) does not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out of 
the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while voluntarily in-
toxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and drugs as 
prohibited by Section 41-6a-502. 
(3) (a) In any case where punitive damages are awarded, the judgment shall provide that 
50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after an allowable 
deduction for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted by the judgment debtor 
to the state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund. 
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an "allowable deduction for the payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs" shall equal the amount of actual and reasonable attorneys' 
UT ST §78-18-1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-18-1 
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fees and costs incurred by the judgment creditor minus the amount of any separate 
judgment awarding attorneys' fees and costs to the judgment creditor. 
(c) The state shall have all rights due a judgment creditor until the judgment is 
satisfied, and stand on equal footing with the judgment creditor of the original case 
in securing a recovery. 
(d) Unless all affected parties, including the state, expressly agree otherwise or the 
application is contrary to the terms of the judgment, any payment on the judgment by 
or on behalf of any judgment debtor, whether voluntary or by execution or otherwise, 
shall be applied in the following order: 
(i) compensatory damages, and any applicable attorneys fees and costs; 
(ii) the initial $20,000 punitive damages; and 
(iii) the balance of the punitive damages. 
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1 CACHE COUNTY, LOGAN, UTAH - JULY 22, 2010 
2 JUDGE CLINT S. JUDKINS PRESIDING 
3 (Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: This case is Bette Samuelsen and others 
7 versus Adrenalin Enterprises, Inc. Let's get appearances of 
8 counsel. 
9 Mr. Baxter? 
10 MR. BAXTER: Brandon Baxter here on behalf of the 
11 plaintiff. 
12 MR. CLEGG: Levi Clegg on behalf of the defendant, 
13 Adrenalin Enterprises, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: We're - the hearing this morning is 
15 scheduled to consider two matters. First is plaintiff's 
16 motion for finding of prima facie case for punitive damages. 
17 And the second is defendant's motion for summary judgment in 
18 regards to punitive damages and second cause of action. They 
19 seem to be inter-related and so I suppose that the arguments 
20 would be connected. 
21 First of all, let's hear, Mr. Baxter, from you. 
22 MR. BAXTER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 On the morning of Sunday, June 24, 2007, three 
24 years and about one month ago, Defendant Adrenalin 
25 Enterprises Inc., which is commonly referred to as ARS, 
1 dispatched its employees to deal with some basement flooding 
2 at an IHC Instacare facility up here on 4th North, here in 
3 Logan. It was a Sunday morning and ARS is the company that 
4 we see in local parades, newspapers, TV, at the movies, 
5 company advertising itself as experts in dealing with flood 
6 remediation. 
7 So, ARS dispatches its employees to the IHC 
8 facility and they discover, as reported, flooding in the 
9 basement at that facility. They work on the problem for a 
10 period of time. And then in conjunction with an ARS 
11 supervisor who's not on site at that time, make the 
12 determination to bring a gasoline-powered pump onto the job. 
13 This is referred to variously, when I was working in 
14 construction, we called it the trash pump. When I worked on 
15 a farm, we called it an irrigation pump. It's a gas pump. 
16 You've got an intake hose that pulls the water in. A 
17 discharge hose that blows it out. It's run by a four-cycle 
18 gasoline powered engine. 
19 They bring the gas-powered pump onto the job site. 
20 And as we learned in depositions, deposition with the, this 
21 particular ARS supervisor, on, on the morning, or date of 
22 this incident, they discovered that this intake hose isn't 
23 going to be long enough to leave the pump outside, reach in 
24 through a basement and pump the water out. So what they 
25 determined to do at that time, Your Honor, was supervisor 
1 said, Well, stick the pump inside. Take this gas-powered 
2 pump, put it in the basement, leave the discharge hose 
3 running out the basement, out the window, and run the gas-
4 powered pump in the basement. 
5 Now, of course, I think it's common knowledge that 
6 running a gas-powered pump indoors is an absolute no-no. You 
7 just don't do it. Federal agencies, local government 
8 entities, industry groups for years and years have been 
9 pounding the drum preaching the dangers of running a gas-
10 powered pump in or near an enclosed structure. 
11 Problem, Your Honor, is carbon monoxide. 
12 Unfortunately, a product of the exhaust produced by a gas-
13 powered engine is carbon monoxide. Carbon monoxide is 
14 lethal. It's dangerous. It injures people. It kills 
15 people. And industry groups, government groups, the public 
16 has known this for years and years. 
17 In fact, in his deposition, ARS's primary 
18 principal, Judson Eades, during his 2000 - during his 
19 deposition admitted that at the time of this June y01 
20 incident, he knew that carbon monoxide was a hazardous gas. 
21 He knew that carbon monoxide could kill people. He knew that 
22 carbon monoxide couldn't be detected by normal human senses. 
23 And that's one of the characteristics of carbon monoxide is 
24 you can't see it. You can't smell it. You can't taste it. 
25 But it will still hurt you. It will still kill you. 
1 Mr. Eades also testified that he knew that small 
2 gas engines'- well, gas engines produce carbon monoxide and 
3 he knew that gas engines in an indoor place created a 
4 problem. 
5 Now, there's this knowledge with ARS as an entity. 
6 On the date of the incident that we're talking about, this 
7 pump that they stuck in the basement, has a clear warning on 
8 the pump itself. That pump warning states, engines emit 
9 carbon monoxide. Do not run in enclosed areas. Despite that 
10 warning, despite all the common knowledge, despite the 
11 knowledge in the company itself, unfortunately, in this case 
12 the employees followed the instructions from their 
13 supervisor. 
14 They stuck this pump in the basement of the 
15 instacare facility, pulled the rip cord, started up the pump, 
16 and for the next hours through that afternoon, pumped water 
17 from the basement without taking any efforts to exhaust or 
18 move the exhaust from the gas-powered pump out of the 
19 basement. It just ran there. There was no hose on the 
20 exhaust. There was no fan. They, they didn't try to push 
21 the exhaust through a window. They just ran it there in the 
22 basement without any precautions whatsoever. 
23 And as one might guess, carbon monoxide filled that 
24 building. Toxic, invisible, odorless, tasteless carbon 
25 monoxide filled the IHC building. 
1 Now later that afternoon, IHC employees started 
2 getting sick. Somebody called the Fire Department. The Fire 
3 Department showed up. They pulled out their carbon monoxide 
4 meter. Readings were in the critical stage. They evacuated 
5 the building, went downstairs, had the ARS employees shut off 
6 the pump and then started transporting people to the 
7 hospital. 
8 The plaintiffs in this case, Bette Samuelsen, 
9 Melisa Adams, Jackie Chamorro, were all IHC employees that 
10 were working upstairs on the date of this incident on June 
11 24th. And all three of them suffered carbon monoxide 
12 poisoning from the ARS gas-powered pump. Despite treatments 
13 in the hyper baric chambers, despite the best efforts of IHC 
14 doctors, all three of these plaintiffs have been injured 
15 seriously. 
16 In the case of Ms. Adams and the case of Ms. 
17 Samuelsen, their injuries are catastrophic. We've been 
18 before the Court already with respect to Rule 35, exams to 
19 establish the extent of these patients', or these plaintiffs' 
20 damages. 
21 In support of those damages, Your Honor, our 
22 pleadings, or our submissions before the Court at this point. 
23 We've had medical records. We have testimony. We've also 
24 submitted expert reports from vocational, a rehab expert that 
25 establishes that there are very significant catastrophic 
injuries in this case. 
Simple fact of this case, Your Honor, is that 
carbon monoxide poses a high degree of danger. ARS knew or 
should have known that carbon monoxide poses a high degree of 
danger and that exposing others to carbon monoxide can kill 
them, can seriously hurt them. Despite that knowledge, 
despite all the information out there that they should have 
known, ARS still engaged in what is highly unreasonable 
conduct which led to exposure of plaintiffs to these high 
levels of carbon monoxide. ARS's actions in this regard 
constitutes an extreme departure from the ordinary standard 
of care within this industry. 
As we've briefed in the materials that we've 
submitted to the Court, ARS was reckless in their actions in 
a number of different ways. When we get to somebody sticking 
a gas-powered pump in a basement with, with no efforts taken 
to evacuate the exhaust or do something there, there's 
something that leads up to that, Your Honor. People, you 
know, mistakes like that just don't happen overnight. And 
what we've discovered in discovery and in depositions, is 
that ARS as an entity recklessly failed to acknowledge the 
real danger that carbon monoxide posed in their industry. 
Furthermore, ARS recklessly failed to train its 
employees prior to this June 27th - June 24th incident in any 
way regarding the characteristics of carbon monoxide, 
1 regarding the dangers of carbon monoxide, regarding how they 
2 prevent carbon monoxide, how they detect carbon monoxide. 
3 ARS supervisors, as we've talked already, and their 
4 employees recklessly created a toxic carbon monoxide 
5 environment within the IHC facility. 
6 Next of all, ARS employees and as a company failed 
7 to use carbon monoxide detectors which are very small, very 
8 inexpensive, very reasonable detectors that can be used on 
9 job sites to detect if there's carbon monoxide problems. 
10 Don't have - well, at the time of the June A07 incident, they 
11 didn't have any carbon monoxide detectors in their company 
12 available for employees to use. When we did their 
13 depositions this last summer, there weren't any carbon 
14 monoxide detectors at the ARS company at that point. 
15 Furthermore, ARS in putting the pump in the 
16 basement, knowing that there are people upstairs, they failed 
17 to take the very, very basic measure of warning people 
18 regarding the dangers that were posed by that pump in the 
19 basement, to give them the opportunity to shut down the 
20 clinic, to evacuate the clinic, to put them on notice 
21 regarding the potential dangers posed by the actions that 
22 they took that day. 
23 Your Honor, their reckless actions, the reckless 
24 actions of ARS have been established carefully and documented 
25 in the submissions that we've sent to the Court. They've 
1 been supported by, I think most importantly, the admissions 
2 and acknowledgments of the defendant, ARS, and its employees 
3 themselves. A big part of our motion was based on their own 
4 deposition testimony and it's out of their own words. I 
5 think that testimony in and of itself, that evidence, is the 
6 most damning of all, all the evidence that we've submitted to 
7 the Court. 
8 In addition to that, Your Honor, we've submitted 
9 publications from numerous federal agencies dating back over 
10 the past decade and a half establishing the dangers of carbon 
11 monoxide, establishing standards for people in industries 
12 that run small gas-powered engines to prevent people like ARS 
13 from exposing themselves or exposing the public to carbon 
14 monoxide dangers. 
15 We've submitted, Your Honor, in support of our 
16 motion for finding of a prima facie case for punitive damages 
17 materials from the industry itself, showing that carbon 
18 monoxide is a real danger. There's people in the remediation 
19 industry that are dying because of carbon monoxide. 
20 And finally, Your Honor, we've also submitted 
21 independently an affidavit of Frank Derroso, an expert who 
22 has over 20 years of experience in industrial hygiene, safety 
23 and training. And it's the conviction and the opinion of Mr. 
24 Derrosso that ARS's actions in this particular case were 
25 reckless in this regard. 
1 Your Honor, I need to touch on at this point some 
2 of the standards that govern the courts proceedings today and 
3 there's been a debate in the pleadings. I'm sure the Court 
4 has noted it. With respect to the standard that should be 
5 applied as to the knowledge that ARS must have before 
6 punitive damages can be, before we can move forward with the 
7 punitive damages in this case. 
8 For years, Your Honor, the standard bearer which 
9 sets out the standard for punitive damages is the case of 
10 Behrens vs. Rawley Hills Hospital. This is a 1983 Utah Case. 
11 And in that case, stated very clearly that the defendant must 
12 either know or should know that their conduct would in high 
13 degree of probability result in a substantial harm to 
14 another. And the debate that's gone back and forth in the 
15 pleadings, Your Honor, is whether it's just simply no, or is 
16 it no and should have known. So, should we just have one 
17 prong that we can proceed down or do we have two prongs that 
18 we can proceed down? 
19 Your Honor, it's the position of the plaintiffs 
20 that you can apply a, the defendants knew, or the defendants 
21 could have knew (sic), could have known. But in the end, 
22 Your Honor, we can show that the defendants did know and also 
23 that they, they should have known. 
24 But let's go back to the Behrens case, this either 
25 know or should know, again, is the standard. After Behrens 
was issued in 1983, since that time, Utah court cases, 
appellate court cases have regularly gone back and cited to 
Behrens as the appropriate standard in making punitive-damage 
decisions. 
In the Gleave case which was cited by defendants in 
their initial briefing here, the Gleave case states that, 
again, the defendant must either know or should know. The 
Gleave case is from 1988. The Gleave case also makes clear 
that although actual intent to cause injury need not be 
shown. Utah case law requires that the defendant must know 
or ought to know. That's from the Gleave case. 
Okay, and continuing on, Your Honor, in 1996, the 
federal level, district court, the case of Boyette vs. L.W. 
Looney & Son. In that case, this 1996 case, they again cite 
the Behren's standard, know or should have known. 
Continuing on, Your Honor, another federal case. 
Taber vs. The Medalware Corporation. A person must either 
know or should know. 
Now, admittedly, in their briefing the defendants 
have, or the defendant has cited to the Daniels case, which 
is a 2009 case. And in the Daniels case, it's a medical 
malpractice case, and admittedly, in Daniels, the focus in 
that particular case was that the defendant had to know that 
a particular medical procedure was going to cause or, or to 
lead to danger. 
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Now, what's interesting in the Daniels case, 
however, is that it cites Behrens. Furthermore, in the 
Daniels case, nowhere in the Daniels case, that Supreme Court 
case do they actually go back and abrogate, set aside 
overturn or reverse the Behrens standard which has been the 
standard for the past almost - well, it's for the past 25 
years in this particular matter. 
But, Your Honor, I think even more tellingly, in 
2010 of this year, a case that's been cited by both parties, 
the Nguyen case, Nguyen vs. IHC Health Services Corp. In 
April of this year, the Nguyen case once again restates the 
Behren standard, knew or should have known. 
So, Your Honor, in this case the standard that the 
Court must apply in determining whether or not a prima facie 
case for punitive damages has been cited is did the defendant 
know or should the defendant have known? 
Now, Your Honor, if we look back at the evidence 
that has presented, let's look at the issue of what 
defendants did know June of 2007. And for this, let's go 
directly to Mr. Eades' deposition. He's the principal at 
ARS. In his deposition he admitted, June of ^07, that he 
knew carbon monoxide was lethal. He knew it was a silent 
killer. He knew that gasoline engines produced carbon 
monoxide. He knew that running engines in an enclosed area 
was a problem. That's what Mr. Eades knew at the time of the 
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1 incident. 
2 Now, Your Honor, what should they have known? 
3 Well, that expands us into a whole other realm of 
4 understanding and knowledge. There's all the training issues 
5 that have been set out. The standards by, by NIOSH and other 
6 federal agencies. There's the issue of carbon monoxide 
7 detectors, again, that has been established by industry 
8 groups. Government entities. Regarding how to warn people 
9 regarding dangers. There's industry standards that ARS was a 
10 part of and should have adhered to. And again, failed to, 
11 failed to follow up. 
12 Just the simple fact of how you appropriately stage 
13 a gas-powered pump. That issue, Your Honor, also is 
14 something that ARS should have known as being part of the 
15 industry, being part of OSHA and having all of this material 
16 at this hand. 
17 So, regardless, Your Honor, whether we're looking 
18 at the element of what ARS knew on June 24th, 2007 or what 
19 ARS should have known on June 24th, 2007, they are culpable. 
20 They understood what was going to happen or should have 
21 understood what was going to happen. And thus, justifies us 
22 moving forward with a punitive damage claim. 
23 Your Honor, another legal issue that arose in the 
24 briefing is the issue of clear and convincing evidence. And 
25 admittedly, clear and convincing evidence is a standard up 
12 
and above the preponderance standard. However, clear and 
convincing evidence - and if we simply look to the 
instruction in MUJI 2d, clear and convincing evidence is a 
higher standard than preponderance. However, clear and 
convincing evidence is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As it states in the instruction, proof by clear and 
convincing evidence requires a greater degree of persuasion 
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but less than 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Your Honor, the materials - in light of that 
standard, let's go back and look at the materials that we 
have presented. The materials that we have presented, 
there's been no dispute of the dangers of carbon monoxide. 
There is no dispute within the materials that we've presented 
with respect to the fact that gasoline engines shouldn't be 
staged in basements. There's been no dispute, Your Honor, 
that ARS knew that some of their equipment produced carbon 
monoxide. There's been no dispute, Your Honor, that these 
industry groups and the governmental groups and other local 
agencies have been publishing for years regarding the dangers 
of carbon monoxide. 
Your Honor, the proof that we have presented is, is 
overwhelming. The arguments that have been made against our 
motion for prima facie finding for a punitive damage claim, 
the arguments that have been made have been legal arguments, 
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1 not factual arguments on the whole. And so we believe very 
2 strongly that the evidence that we've presented, presents a 
3 prima facie case of clear and convincing evidence for a 
4 punitive damage claim. 
5 Now, Your Honor, at the end of the day, whether or 
6 not we clearly meet that clear and convincing evidence burden 
7 - well, that's left to the folks that sit in that jury box 
8 over there. But for the purpose of today, for the purpose of 
9 the question, have we met our prima facie case? I think the 
10 clear answer there is yes. 
11 Your Honor, I'm going to ask how you'd like me to 
12 proceed at this point. They've asserted an independent 
13 summary judgment motion against our cause of action for 
14 negligent training, supervision and hiring. Would you like 
15 me to address that at this point or do you want me to wait 
16 until they deal with that issue separate-
17 THE COURT: While you're standing there-
18 MR. BAXTER: - okay-
19 THE COURT: - why don't you go ahead and address 
20 that issue, Mr. Baxter. 
21 MR. BAXTER: Very good, Your Honor 
22 First of all, the negligent training, supervision 
23 and the hiring case, claims. Your Honor, to the extent that 
24 our punitive damage case, we've met that as a prima facie 
25 case. The prima facie case for punitive damages is tied 
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1 intrinsically into these training, supervision and hiring 
2 claims. And so those claims are necessary to allow us to 
3 present this evidence regarding punitive damages. 
4 Now, with respect to the claims as they stand 
5 themselves, and Mr. Clegg in his briefing pointed out that 
6 perhaps myself and our firm wasn't quite understanding the 
7 gist of their argument with respect to if they admit 
8 vicarious liability then these claims should, should, should 
9 be, you know, considered moot or redundant, duplicative and 
10 should not move forward. 
11 Perhaps, Your Honor, it's not the first time maybe 
12 I haven't understood where something was going or the 
13 argument there. But to the extent I understand it at this 
14 point, Your Honor, the argument's been made by defendant 
15 that, Well, if we admit that our employees were - well, if we 
16 admit vicarious liability for the actions of our employees in 
17 staging this pump in the basement of IHC, well, that makes 
18 all these other issues moot. It makes them duplicative. 
19 Your Honor, I think there's a fine distinction, 
20 however, here. The claims against the employees themselves, 
21 that's, that's vicarious liability. Your Honor, there is a 
22 distinction when we look at the claim against the company 
23 itself which is a direct liability claim. The claims against 
24 the company for negligent training, supervision and hiring 
25 are direct claims against the company themselves. And, Your 
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1 Honor, Mr. Clegg and his office cited a number of cases that 
2 indicate that there are some jurisdictions out there who have 
3 said and have supported the argument that they're advocating 
4 at this time. 
5 First of all, it's important to note that Utah 
6 hasn't accepted that position. And in Utah, the negligent 
7 supervision, hiring and training claims still exist as an 
8 independent tort and are able to move forward. So, unless 
9 this Court is striking out and creating new law here in the 
10 state of Utah, I think our claims ought to go forth. 
11 And, Your Honor, after I, I looked at Mr. Clegg's 
12 reply and the arguments that he made, and him pointing out 
13 that perhaps I didn't understand the gist of the argument, I, 
14 I went back and did some additional research. Your Honor, 
15 there are other jurisdictions out there as well. For 
16 example, Kansas, who have looked at this issue and I have a 
17 Kansas case here. 
18 If I might approach the bench? 
19 MR. CLEGG: Your Honor, I would object to the 
20 admission of this. This wasn't a part of the briefing, Your 
21 Honor, Rule 7, he has the obligation to-
22 THE COURT: Well, the Court's not going to read it 
23 at this point in time. But I'll receive it (inaudible). 
24 MR. CLEGG: Thank you, Your Honor. 
25 MR. BAXTER: The argument at the Kansas court was 
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1 that the torts in negligent hiring, retention and supervision 
2 of torts distinct from respondeat superior and are not 
3 derivative of the employees' negligence. Negligence is not 
4 imputed, but instead, runs directly from the employer to the 
5 person injured. 
6 Your Honor, I pulled that case out to, to show you 
7 that there is a fine distinction between the claims of 
8 respondeat superior and the direct tortious claims against 
9 the employer itself. And so to the extent that we're looking 
10 at these claims, the negligent hiring and training, 
11 supervision claims independent from the punitive damage 
12 claims, they do have a right to stand on their own. 
13 Furthermore, Your Honor, as I pointed out earlier, 
14 the claims themselves with respect to how they tie into the 
15 punitive damage claims have to stand because there are facts 
16 with respect to the training and supervision that give rise 
17 to punitive damage claims. 
18 Your Honor, at the conclusion of the day, 
19 plaintiffs, we believe that this is an egregious case. This 
20 is a case where ARS and its employees were recklessly wanton 
21 in placing that gas engine, running it for the time that they 
22 did. People have been seriously hurt because of this case. 
23 It's not a case of simple negligence. This is a case that 
24 calls for punitive damages. And as such we would ask that 
25 our motion be granted. Thank you. 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Clegg? 
2 MR. CLEGG: Good morning, Your Honor. 
3 I trust that Your Honor received the courtesy copy 
4 of the pleadings before (inaudible)? 
5 THE COURT: I received it. 
6 MR. CLEGG: And you received it twice? 
7 THE COURT: Appreciate the voluminous-
8 MR. CLEGG: Yeah-
9 THE COURT: - (inaudible). 
10 MR. CLEGG: I won't tell you what the FedEx bill was 
11 for that. 
12 Your Honor, this is a simple mistake. It's a 
13 mistake of judgment. I stand before you. I think it's easy. 
14 And we all say as a matter of common sense, with the 
15 hindsight or the benefit of 20-20 vision, it shouldn't have 
16 happened. But, nevertheless, that's a case of simple 
17 negligence. This isn't a case of an egregious crime, an 
18 intentional tort, an intentional crime. This is a mistake of 
19 judgment which under governing Utah law, doesn't rise to the 
20 level to justify the imposition of punishment damages. 
21 Punitive damages are punishment. We're seeking to punish 
22 ARS, at least the plaintiffs are, through this. 
23 I think it's first important to track through the 
24 history leading up to the governing standard which is knowing 
25 and reckless. So the governing statute in Utah is 
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1 78D-8-201(l) Subparagraph A and basically sets out, 
2 willfulness and maliciousness intent or knowing and 
3 recklessness. I presume in all the briefing by the 
4 plaintiffs have been focused on the second prong of that 
5 which is the knowing and reckless. 
6 In Daniels vs. Gamma West Br achy therapy, LLC, 
7 decision which is 2009 Utah 66, does a very good job of 
8 giving a discussion on this knowing and reckless prong. And 
9 there was certainly no intent within the court's discussion 
10 to limit it to just a medical malpractice claim. 
11 Instead, what they do, is they look at it and they 
12 say, first of all, and the timing's important, the Behrens 
13 decision, I mispronounced that, I apologize. But the Utah 
14 Supreme Court 1983 decision which does give the good quotes, 
15 if you will, that have been latched onto by many courts is 
16 correct and is still good law. But the Daniels court said we 
17 need to help clarify that, help under, let other people 
18 understand what has happened since this decision so that you 
19 can correctly interpret and apply the standard. 
20 So, in 1989, so following the Behrens decision, the 
21 Utah Legislature amended the punitive damages statute, again, 
22 78 - it's now 78D-8-201 at that point of legislatively 
23 amending it was still in the 78. Anyhow, they purposely 
24 amended it and put in the knowledge requirement. And there 
25 was a discussion and Daniels court goes through and discusses 
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1 the Florida Bates and finds this as governing, as governing 
2 the actual standard required to prove actual knowledge. So 
3 this isn't should have known or maybe have known. It 
4 required actual knowledge. And the reason being it requires 
5 actual knowledge is the whole intent of punitive damages is 
6 to punish. It is something that is equivalent to an 
7 intentional crime. It's those such egregious and malicious 
8 acts that we need to prevent. 
9 Again, in this situation, this is a mistake of 
10 judgment. But to satisfy this actual knowledge prong as 
11 applied to the facts, it takes something more than a general 
12 understanding from the principal of ARS or from some 
13 technicians that carbon monoxide is a dangerous thing. I 
14 think Your Honor probably is well aware of that. I'd be very 
15 pressed to find anybody (inaudible) stopped on the street 
16 that didn't say as a matter of common sense, I understand 
17 that carbon monoxide is a problem. That's not the standard. 
18 As applied to the facts here, what we would have to 
19 prove for the actual knowledge prong is that an ARS 
20 supervisor or somebody in a management-level capacity was on-
21 site, consciously thought, Okay, if we place this pump here, 
22 I will inflict harm on the workers up there and I'm still 
23 gonna make the decision to do that in conscious disregard. 
24 That's not the evidence and that's not the record. 
25 [ The ARS supervisor that's been referred to as, at 
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1 the direction of, it was a Sunday. He was off-site. We have 
2 two ARS technicians respond to the flood. They used the 
3 traditional equipment. The traditional equipment - allow me 
4 to go off just a tiny bit, so you have a full picture in 
5 background - is these trucks. They're called a vortex truck. 
6 They're basically kind of a, kind of a cargo-style truck that 
7 has a big suction pump on it and then a tank attached to 
8 that. And they'll run a hose inside of a building out from 
9 this truck and that's how they extract water. Generally 
10 speaking that, they, in the testimony in the record is that 
11 that type of equipment along with some fans is used in 99 
12 percent of the flood remediation out there. 
13 So, these two technicians show up. This is a 
14 bigger flood. The flood's still coming in. It's June. We 
15 have water running through the creek. It's coming through 
16 the ground water into this basement faster than they can get 
17 it out. They make the decision to go pull this gas-powered 
18 pump, piece of equipment that's very rarely used. As a 
19 matter of fact, since the ownership changed, which we briefed 
20 for you, and not to jump too far off basis here, but ARS, the 
21 principal Judd Eades had purchased it the year before. In 
22 the time that he had purchased it, this pump had never been 
23 used. All the testimony said, in the whole time that ARS and 
24 its predecessor might have had this pump, it was used only 
25 three times. And two of those were outside and one was in a 
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1 vacant house. And so its not a common piece of equipment 
2 that we have a ton of knowledge on. Up-front knowledge that 
3 this is a thing. 
4 So then back to the clinic. We don't have the 
5 supervisor who's on-site saying, let's get this pump. Let's 
6 put it here. Let's use it. Instead, he's off-site. We have 
7 the two technicians who show up, say you know, this water is 
8 coming in quicker than we can deal with it. They make the 
9 decision to go and grab it. They call a supervisor who says, 
10 Yeah, I guess that sounds like a good idea. 
11 There's no evidence and because it didn't happen 
12 this way that the ARS supervisor was told, Hey, this 
13 building's full of people and if we run it, we're not gonna 
14 open a window. If we run it we're not gonna put it here or 
15 we're not gonna do whatever we can to vent the carbon 
16 monoxide. That's just simply not the case. 
17 It was a mistake of judgment for the ARS 
18 technicians to run the pump in the basement and then do it. 
19 But I think what's very telling as to this mistake of 
20 judgment is that they themselves exposed, or they were 
21 exposing themselves to carbon monoxide at the same time. 
22 They were working throughout the afternoon in the basement in 
23 the closed area right next to the pumps throughout the day 
24 and they themselves never stopped to think, Oh, this might be 
25 J a problem. 
22 
1 I find it hard to believe that two people or two 
2 technicians would act, or you know, with actual knowledge, 
3 consciously disregard this risk of, you know, carbon monoxide 
4 for themselves. 
5 So with that I would say that the actual knowledge 
6 problem proves fatal to the plaintiffs' claim for prima facie 
7 case for punitive damages. 
8 The second prong now is the recklessness prong. So 
9 we have the knowing and reckless. All the evidence we've had 
10 supported in the record at most showed recklessness. I 
11 certainly don't concede it's recklessness, but at most it 
12 would go to show that. However, I would think that a little 
13 bit more information about these employees is important to 
14 understand as well. 
15 ARS didn't just go out and grab two guys off the 
16 street, said here's the truck, go for it. Both of these 
17 employees have been long-time employees. One employee by the 
18 name of Robert Walsh had worked for ARS for a year and a 
19 half. Prior to that he had spent 20 years in a Navy shipyard 
20 building nuclear submarines up in Washington. He was a 
21 Vietnam vet. Was a very capable, responsible individual. 
22 Cleared background check. Was a very honest, hardworking, 
23 straight guy. Nothing in his employment history would have 
24 ever led ARS to think that he was some, you know, walking 
25 danger. 
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1 The other gentleman, Jeff Stings, had worked at ARS 
2 as a laborer through his high school years. And then after 
3 high school worked for ARS and I believe it was five or six 
4 years, full time. At the same point he was also a part-time 
5 fire fighter. Had extensive training as an EMT, paramedic. 
6 Again, a very good employee. Clean background. Nothing in 
7 his history. Nothing in his performance had ever led ARS to 
8 think we have a known danger here. 
9 They're hiring good people. They're doing training 
10 with these people. Yes, a significant amount of training 
11 does occur on the job. It's a construction-type industry. 
12 It's something that you, you know, you can't blackboard and 
13 hand out, you know, PowerPoint presentations. At least, it's 
14 not as effective as on-the-job training. But as the 
15 testimony all shows, they never just sent out an under-
16 qualified technician on his own to handle jobs. There was 
17 team, a senior guy up with a junior guy who were then 
18 monitored by a supervisor. They're taking the reasonable 
19 steps that they can to make sure they're doing the best job 
20 in their flood remediation efforts. 
21 Again, we have here an immediate, or I am sorry, an 
22 admitted mistake. And I think that there's been no secret 
23 throughout this case. We were been before you about six 
24 weeks ago on the Rule 35 motions to comply the examination, 
25 medical examinations of the plaintiffs. We've all along 
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1 said, we admit it. It's a mistake. ARS acknowledges it. 
2 They accept the liability for it. And they're willing to try 
3 to do what they can to compensate the plaintiffs reasonably 
4 and fairly for their loss. And that's really what the focus 
5 of this case is on at this point. 
6 And that kind of sends into our second clause, or 
7 our second component of our motion for summary judgment. And 
8 that is the negligent employment claims. Wrapped up in that 
9 is negligent hiring, negligent supervision. And I think Mr. 
10 Baxter is correct, that cause of action is sort of 
11 intertwined with their claim for punitive damages. It's hard 
12 to separate those both out. 
13 But the, our argument simply stated is is ARS is 
14 here. They're answering for the acts of their employees. 
15 And first of all, the employees haven't been named 
16 individually. Only ARS has been named. They're the only 
17 party to this suit. All along, they've stood up and said, 
18 Yes, this is our employees, they were in the course and scope 
19 of employment. We are source of recovery. 
20 If you'll track through the Utah law regarding 
21 negligent employment supervision, it's really kind of a 
22 novelty, if you will. Yes, it is well recognized. But it's 
23 isolated to those specific instances where the circumstances 
24 of the employment has placed an actor in a position 
25 advantageous or in some area where he can commit a tort. 
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However, once he does that intentional tort, it takes them 
outside of the course and scope of employment. And then it 
seems unfair that the employer should be able to walk away 
because they don't have to answer for the negligent - oh, I'm 
sorry, the intentional acts of their employees. 
So let me take that out of context and apply it 
specifically, and I think the most common is is where let's 
say, a police officer, who a police department hires a 
person. This person might have a known background. Might 
have had a sexual, history of sexual assault. Nevertheless, 
they don't properly supervise or do background checks. They 
take this police officer and they hire him. And then that 
police officer uses their employment and their, their 
authority granted to them to then commit some sort of sexual 
assault act. 
And in that case, the actual act itself, the 
intentional tort obviously falls outside of the course and 
scope of employment. But courts have said, Yes, but this is 
patently unfair to allow the employer to sort of robe this 
actor, you know, put this actor out there with their 
authority, but then not answer for their torts. 
This is not that situation. The plaintiffs have a 
source of recovery. They have ARS who has stood up to the 
plate and said, yes, we admit that we have the liability for 
their acts. In that situation the second cause of action in 
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1 this case for negligent employment, basically becomes 
2 subsumed into the vicarious liability action and to do 
3 otherwise would also potentially prejudice a jury. To allow 
4 plaintiffs to present evidence to try and stir emotions, to 
5 stir anger or frustration changes the focus away from what 
6 this case is about of fairly and reasonably compensating them 
7 for their injuries. And instead, runs the risk of bringing 
8 in much irrelevant evidence really for only defamatory 
9 purposes, Your Honor. 
10 I would close finally by just discussing the clear 
11 and convincing evidence standard. I certainly would agree 
12 that it doesn't mean proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But it 
13 is certainly something more than just a preponderance of 
14 evidence. It's an additional gate-keeping function at this 
15 stage on a punitive damages motion by which the court can 
16 help shield and keep those claims that really are not, do not 
17 belong as part of the case and allow focus on those issues 
18 that are important. 
19 I don't think there's any dispute either, and we've 
20 cited for you in there the case (inaudible). It it's going 
21 to be a clear and convincing evidentiary standard at trial, 
22 that same standard is now applicable at the summary judgment 
23 stage when Your Honor makes the decision whether there's 
24 sufficient issues of fact to go forward. 
25 Is there any questions, Your Honor? 
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1 THE COURT: Not right now, maybe in a minute. 
2 Mr. Baxter? 
3 MR. BAXTER: Your Honor, I want to address the 
4 Daniels case really quickly here. In the Daniels case, 
5 again, this is the medical malpractice case that regarded a 
6 treatment for colon cancer. In the Daniels case, when they 
7 discuss what the defendant in that particular case had to 
8 know, the language from the Daniels case is that Mr. Daniels 
9 must prove that Dr. Hayes knew the danger presented by 
10 administering a high dose of radiation in a non-standard 
11 treatment for colon cancer. Okay. 
12 I think the defense is trying to push this 
13 knowledge element too far. I don't think there's anything in 
14 the case law, anything in the statute that requires the 
15 plaintiffs to prove that ARS knew that on June 24th, 2007 
16 when they put the gas-powered pump in that basement, how many 
17 hours it was going to take for carbon monoxide to reach a 
18 level. I don't think there's anything in the case law that 
19 requires them to know that, that the exact mechanics of how 
20 the carbon monoxide was going to work up from the basement. 
21 There's nothing in the case law or the statute that requires 
22 us to show that ARS knew how the plaintiffs were going to 
23 ingest the carbon monoxide. 
24 Simply with respect to the knowing prong, we have 
25 to show that they knew that there was a danger there. That 
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1 despite knowing that there was a danger there, they pressed 
2 forward without taking any effort to ameliorate the danger. 
3 Now, what did ARS know? What they, should they 
4 have known? We talked about Mr. Eades' deposition of what, 
5 what he knew about the dangers of carbon monoxide. We've 
6 cited in our materials submitted to the court that ARS 
7 supervisors, principals, knew that they had equipment that 
8 emitted carbon monoxide. And they knew that their employees 
9 worked in areas that presented carbon monoxide risks. Your 
10 Honor, if we're looking at knowing, that's sufficient. Under 
11 the Daniels standard, if we're looking at that knowing, for 
12 us to press forward with punitive damage claim. 
13 Your Honor, beyond the knowing, again, we look to 
14 the most recent statement of punitive damage standards in the 
15 state of Utah. That's the Nguyen case from April 2010 this 
16 year. The Nguyen case, again, recites the Behrens known or 
17 should have known standard. 
18 So, Your Honor, even if you find that we, we've not 
19 pressed forward far enough on the known standard, we still 
20 have the second alternative prong. And I think the 
21 overwhelming evidence has been presented in our briefing and 
22 it's been presented in the arguments today is that they 
23 should have known the dangers posed by carbon monoxide, how 
24 they could have prevented it and they failed to do anything. 
25 That, that's the simple fact of the matter. 
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1 The defense has argued that, you know, this is, 
2 this is a simple mistake. This was an error in judgment. 
3 Well, Your Honor, it's not an error in judgment when a 
4 company, the type of ARS that's in basements all the time, 
5 working for people throughout this community, when a company 
6 like that provides no carbon monoxide training whatsoever to 
7 its employees, none whatsoever. 
8 The deposition testimony and what's been presented 
9 to the Court and un-reputed by the defense is that ARS 
10 management failed to provide any specific carbon monoxide 
11 training to its employees. No printed materials. No 
12 trainings. Nothing about what, what the dangers of carbon 
13 monoxide are. Nothing about how you test for carbon 
14 monoxide. Nothing about running pumps. How you're supposed 
15 to run a pump. That's not just a simple mistake, Your Honor. 
16 That's reckless conduct. It's the sort of conduct that 
17 requires a punitive damage award to bring attention to the 
18 matter and get the matter fixed. That's what the purpose of 
19 punitive damages are. 
20 For ARS to simply say, well, we hire people. They 
21 may have worked at a naval shipyard a number of years ago or 
22 they may have had some training somewhere else. Well, this 
23 is a last-second after-the-fact argument that they've made. 
24 The evidence that we've presented to the Court is before they 
25 went into this incident, they didn't determine what, if any, 
30 
1 training any of their employees have on carbon monoxide or 
2 anything like that. It's not as if we hire a person. We do 
3 a full detailed report of what training that they have and 
4 then we know that they're safe going out. That's not what 
5 they do. 
6 What the evidence with the deposition testimony 
7 shows is we hire people, we throw them out into the field. 
8 But they're good people. They've worked with us for a long 
9 time, but we don't know if they've had carbon monoxide 
10 training. We don't know if they, they understand that carbon 
11 monoxide can kill. We don't know that if they understand 
12 that putting a pump in a basement is going to hurt somebody, 
13 perhaps kill someone. They didn't know any of that before 
14 they sent these employees out, Your Honor. 
15 It's, it's a mistake. But it's not a simple 
16 mistake. It's a reckless mistake. These actions were taken 
17 without any regard for the safety of the folks that were 
18 working upstairs taking care of other people. ARS, their 
19 employees had a duty to take care of the rest of the people 
20 in the IHC building who, who had no ability to care for 
21 themselves. ARS was in there doing a job. The IHC people, 
22 the plaintiffs in this case were upstairs doing their job and 
23 it was the duty of ARS to take care of those people when they 
24 were taking care of the water in the basement. They failed 
25 to do so. They failed to do so in a reckless and egregious 
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1 manner than certainly justifies us to move forward, not with 
2 a, with a clear award of punitive damages today, Your Honor, 
3 but we, we've met the hurdle and I think we can go forward 
4 with our punitive damage claim. And we're in a position 
5 where we ought to be able to present it to the jury and let 
6 the folks from the community decide whether or not a punitive 
7 damage award is justified in this case. Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Clegg-
9 MR. CLEGG: I'll be brief. 
10 THE COURT: Before you begin-
11 Mr. Baxter, you gave me a general definition of the 
12 purpose of punitive damages. I'd like you to think about it 
13 for a minute, then I'll ask you what, what you think the 
14 purpose specifically of punitive damages is. 
15 Mr. Clegg? 
16 MR. CLEGG: Yes, Your Honor, I'll be brief. 
17 THE COURT: And I'll ask you that same question when 
18 you get through to. Go ahead. 
19 MR. CLEGG: Would you like me to address that now, 
20 Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
22 MR. CLEGG: My understanding is your question is, 
23 where are those situations where punitive damages would be 
24 appropriate? 
25 THE COURT: What's the purpose of punitive damages? 
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1 MR. CLEGG: Purpose, my understand the purpose of 
2 punitive damages is to punish an actor. 
3 THE COURT: Why do we want to do that though? 
4 MR. CLEGG: Such as to prevent certain acts in the 
5 future. I guess that would mirror the concept behind we 
6 imprison felons and these types of actors. 
7 But what I would submit to the Court is under the 
8 actual knowledge prong, under the interpretation given by 
9 plaintiffs, we would be running into a situation where every 
10 time a person is at a stop light, it turns yellow, they 
11 decide they're gonna turn left and maybe beat it and they 
12 turn in front of somebody who's coming the other way and they 
13 cause a car accident. Well, would that then become a 
14 situation where punitive damages should be warranted in every 
15 case? 
16 Well, certainly there's an argument that there's 
17 some level of negligence, some sort of recklessness present 
18 that by turning left on a yellow. There's also some level of 
19 an argument that there should, there should be some knowledge 
20 that if I take this act and I make this left turn that I 
21 might become involved in an accident or cause an accident. 
22 Those ^should haves' or ^maybes' aren't sufficient 
23 in a punitive damages analysis. The question is is do we 
24 want, is this something that we need to punish this person? 
25 I Meaning, did this person really know of this risk? Really 
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1 have pretty solid information that says, I know if I do this 
2 I'm gonna cause something harmful to another person, but I'm 
3 still gonna consciously disregard it and walk away from it 
4 and, and just ignore it and do it anyway. That's not this 
5 situation. It is a mistake of judgment. 
6 Should they have put the pump in the basement and 
7. ran it? No. But they weren't trying to hurt anybody. They 
8 weren't consciously disregarding some risk that they knew 
9 they were posing to the IHC employees, to themselves. And 
10 it's even relevant in the deposition testimony, IHC had one 
11 of their own maintenance workers there who was kind of &, the 
12 building maintenance guy, in and out of the building 
13 throughout the day who was aware they were running the pump 
14 in the basement. I don't insinuate that it was his job to 
15 tell them to stop, but it's one of those things that didn't 
16 occur to anybody in the building until the Fire Department 
17 showed up and they tested. 
18 Smart? No. With the benefit of hindsight being 
19 20-20, yes. Could it have been avoided? Certainly. But is 
20 this one of those situations where it justifies punishing ARS 
21 because they had actual knowledge, where they really are 
22 these evil act - this is just not that situation. They're 
23 taking good people, solid employees, solid backgrounds. They 
24 do quite a bit of training. 
25 J Do they purposely say or in the evidence is their 
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1 purpose, any instance where they say, don't run a generator 
2 in a closed room with people in it? No. Why not? Probably 
3 at some level it's common sense. There is a lot of 
4 discussion there though that ARS has trained their employees, 
5 This pump is a piece of equipment they very, very rarely use,, 
6 On the equipment they use in 99 percent of their flood 
7 remediation efforts, the employers (sic) are trained on it. 
8 They're aware, they go in, they suck out the water. They 
9 peel back carpet. They peel back drywall if need be. They 
10 run fans. They call in a plumber to check a furnace. Or, 
11 you know, or a plumber or a mechanical guy to check the 
12 furnace, to check the water heater, to make sure carbon 
13 monoxide is not coming out of that. But it's not their job 
14 to be the first ones that would be responding and measuring 
15 carbon monoxide. It's just not a risk. If they come, that 
16 they would come into contact with in their every day 
17 performing flood remediation efforts. This is a unique 
18 situation. And yes, they made a mistake of judgment. 
19 Any other questions, Your Honor? 
20 THE COURT: I don't think so - well, one of you, 
21 tell me, when did they turn the pump off on this thing? 
22 MR. CLEGG: By the evidence that we understand, the 
23 pump began running at approximately 1:00 on that Sunday 
24 afternoon of June 24th, 2007. And it ran to approximately 
25 4:00. Our basis for that time line is we know that the 
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1 police responders through the fire department report showed 
2 up about 4:00. So it was roughly a three-hour run time. 
3 THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that. Your pleadings 
4 indicate that. But I guess my specific question is, somebody 
5 got sick. Did they turn the pump off then or did they wait 
6 till the fire department got there and said, Hey, you've got 
7 a pump running downstairs. Maybe you ought to turn it off? 
8 MR. CLEGG: My understanding is those events 
9 happened pretty quickly. A few of the staff upstairs in the 
10 IHC clinic notified the doctor who was on call, was working 
11 that day. After about the second one said, I feel a little 
12 nauseous, the doctor went, Hmmm, called the fire department. 
13 And right when they called the fire department, the pump was 
14 shut off. I don't know if somebody specifically told ARS the 
15 fire department is on the way or if the fire department 
16 showed up. But my understanding that period of time was very 
17 close, meaning the emergency response team was there within a 
18 minute. 
19 THE COURT: Now, the plaintiff has indicated the 
20 treatment that was received by his clients. Were, were the 
21 employees of the defendant treated in any manner? Did they 
22 suffer damages as a result of it? 
23 MR. CLEGG: No. Our, our technician, the, our 
24 technicians went home. Our principal, Mr.-
25 MR. BAXTER: - Your Honor, I think the deposition 
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1 testimony that we actually presented shows that their 
2 technicians went to the hospital. 
3 MR. CLEGG: Yes. And that's what I was getting to. 
4 They went home following the incident. Our principal, Judd 
5 Eades, called them, said, Hey, get your guys get over to the 
6 hospital. I'm demanding you go seek treatment. They went 
7 there. They were on, they (inaudible) hemoglobin levels were 
8 measured and they were on oxygen treatment for a short period 
9 of time. They went home that night and they were at work the 
10 next Monday morning. 
11 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. 
12 Mr. Baxter, tell me what you think the purpose of 
13 punitive damages are. 
14 MR. BAXTER: Your Honor, I think the Behrens case 
15 sets it out best. In the Behrens case it says, starts out 
16 and I openly concede, the general rule is that punitive 
17 damages aren't awarded. But punitive damages, they're not 
18 intended as additional compensation to the plaintiff. They 
19 must, if awarded, serve a societal interest in punishing and 
20 deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which is not 
21 likely to be deterred by other means. 
22 Your Honor, and that's exactly where we're at 
23 today. There was, there's no citation that's been issued to 
24 ARS. ARS-
25 THE COURT: I don't want your argument. I just 
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1 wanted an explanation. 
2 MR. BAXTER: Okay, yeah. 
3 THE COURT: You've had a chance to argue. Also, 
4 while you're standing, Mr. Baxter, when you begin (sic) your 
5 argument, you said that the ARS claims to be experts. Did 
6 anything you submitted to me show that? 
7 MR. BAXTER: ARS, yeah. Exhibit I, the ARS company 
8 profile states, "ARS Flood and Fire Cleanup is a full-service 
9 disaster restoration company serving in Utah, Idaho and 
10 Wyoming. We do everything within our ability to serve your 
11 needs. Our qualified technicians and estimators do work for 
12 you by being professional, fair, honest and hard working." 
13 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. 
14 MR. BAXTER: Well, also, it continues. "Our staff 
15 is trained in every aspect of restoration." 
16 So that's all, Your Honor. Any other questions. 
17 THE COURT: No, I don't think so. 
18 The ruling on this, let me indicate, counsel, I 
19 went through all of the documentation that you submitted, 
20 your memorandums and etcetera. And your arguments are very 
21 persuasive, but it, quite frankly, hasn't changed my opinion 
22 after reading what you submitted in writing previously. And 
23 I made some notes. I'm going to kind of sort through these. 
24 They're not as good as, good as order as I would like them to 
25 be, but let me go through them in ruling. 
38 
The purpose of the hearing today as far as the 
plaintiff is concerned, I guess, and also in response to the 
motion for summary judgment, etcetera, that is to place on 
the record whether or not there's, this Court can find that 
there's a prima facie case for the clear and convincing 
evidence. In fact, let me maybe read some of my notes here. 
My job today is to, as far as the plaintiffs are concerned in 
the regard, is to ascertain if it is reasonably likely that 
the plaintiff can convince the trier of fact by clear and 
convincing evidence to award punitive damages in this case. 
The discovery of defendants wwealth and financial 
conditions is not being sought for harassment. So those are 
the two purposes. Nothing has been submitted to the Court as 
it relates to harassment. I'll address that issue in a 
minute. 
The, to meet that requirement, the following 
elements must be established. First, a high degree of danger 
was apparent. Second, the defendant knew or should have know 
that his conduct would likely result in substantial harm. 
And three, its highly unreasonable conduct or extreme 
departure from ordinary care. 
Let me indicate that the defendants argue that it 
must be shown that the tort feasor had actual knowledge of 
the danger created by his conduct. And as I review the 
cases, the case law and the arguments in support thereof, 
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1 it's this Court's opinion that I reject that argument. The 
2 finding that the plaintiff must show by clear and convincing 
3 evidence that the danger was either known or that the tort 
4 feasor should have known of the same. 
5 Now, in this particular case, Mr. Baxter argues, 
6 Well, they really didn't know. And I guess it's an argument 
7 as to whether how much knowledge needed to be there. Whether 
8 it was actual knowledge as set forth by Mr. Clegg that by 
9 running that machine that day in those circumstances the 
10 danger would result to the occupants of the building. Or as 
11 Mr. Baxter sets forth that, Well, we knew that if you run a 
12 machine in an enclosed environment it could cause damage. So 
13 that's a question that, again, the trier of fact would have 
14 to ascertain at a hearing. 
15 One overriding thing the Court notes is the pump 
16 itself used in this case had an obvious warning on it. And 
17 whether they were technicians or supervisors or just exactly 
18 who was involved, the pump told them not to operate in an 
19 enclosed environment. 
20 And I guess my question to you is that related to 
21 what is the purpose of a punitive damage as well, to punish, 
22 to punish somebody for the actions that they've taken. But 
23 as pointed out in the Behrens case, that probably the 
24 overriding purpose of punishment or punitive damages is to 
25 public policy. To show others similarly situated that you 
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shouldn't engage in that type of activity or the 
consequences, you'll be punished for it and the consequences 
will be severe. 
If one holds itself out to be an expert or at least 
proficient in a particular field or area, can others not 
reasonably rely on that representation? And if they do and 
as a result thereof suffer substantial harm, should not the 
one claiming to be proficient or expert, and who really isn't 
to be punished? Ergo punitive damages. And I think the 
Behrens case stands for the fact, yes, if you hold yourself 
out in certain areas as an expert or as an, proficient, at 
least, in that particular area and you lead others to rely 
upon your representations and then they're damaged as a 
result thereof, then punitive damages apply. 
And so the Court here finds that, that it is 
reasonably likely that the jury or trier of fact here could 
award punitive damages and as such will grant the motion 
presented by plaintiff. And in so doing will reject the 
motion for summary judgment in regard to punitive damages in 
the second cause of action. 
In speaking of the second cause of action, it seems 
like there's some misunderstanding or at least, unclear as to 
exactly what the plaintiff is pursuing there. And I don't 
interpret that. And I suppose we'll clarify that as we 
advance toward trial. But I don't interpret that as a claim 
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1 for any second recovery. But its certainly, in view of the 
2 Court's decision here as it relates to punitive damages, it's 
3 something that the jury should hear to determine whether or 
4 not punitive damages should be awarded. 
5 Mr. Baxter, will you prepare an order? 
6 MR. BAXTER: I will, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: In accordance with the Court's ruling 
8 here today. 
9 Any questions about, by way of clarification? 
10 MR. CLEGG: No, Your Honor. 
11 MR. BAXTER: Your Honor, there's one tangential 
12 matter and, and almost embarrassed to bring it up to the 
13 Court again. We bother the Court so much on this particular 
14 issue. If we could return back to the Rule 35 exam and just 
15 let me-
16 Levi, this is in regards to Bette's (inaudible). 
17 MR. CLEGG: Your Honor, I'd object. Only in the 
18 sense that we're still waiting on affidavits of - it comes 
19 down to the compensation in order to be paid to the 
20 companions for traveling back. And now my understanding is 
21 there's a new request that we pay lost wages for Ms. 
22 Samuelson for the time sent back as well. The issue we have 
23 is we don't know the amount we're facing at this point, even 
24 on the companions. We're waiting on the affidavits. 
25 THE COURT: The Court's not prepared to address 
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that, although my memory is such that I can remember the 
arguments. 
MR. BAXTER: Well, Your Honor, and I think this will 
save a phone call. If you could just give us a thumbs up and 
thumbs down on this. Ms. Samuelson, she is one of the 
plaintiffs in the case who's been ordered to attend the Rule 
35 exam. Your Honor, she works part-time at Thomas Edison as 
a teacher's aide. And we would request that her time off 
work be compensated by the defendant. Her time spent 
attending the Rule 35 exam in Maryland. And, you know, 
simply we need to know if that's something the Court would 
grant or not grant. We can provide all that-
THE COURT: - (inaudible) consider it favorably. 
But on the other hand my experience with, and I think the 
affidavits Mr. Clegg is pointing out here is, my experience 
is the temporary teacher's etcetera, is they can adjust those 
time frames, etcetera. 
MR. BAXTER: It's not a temporary, and I apologize 
if I used the word temporary, Your Honor. She's a part-time 
classroom aide. And so her school week begins, I think, 
Tuesday the week that she's been scheduled to go the Rule 35 
exam. And so she would be missing time that she would 
otherwise be working at Thomas Edison school as a result of 
attending this Rule 35 exam in Maryland. 


























address that. I would like to hear your arguments in support 
thereof. But I guess the best I could give you today is I 
would probably favorably look at compensation (inaudible). 
MR. BAXTER: Your Honor, I'll work with Mr. Clegg. 
THE COURT: That would depend on the circumstances, 
etcetera. 
And I'm sure that, Mr. Clegg, what you're referring 
to is the affidavits would flush that out. 
MR. CLEGG: That's right, Your Honor. At some level 
we would offer per diem compensation. Otherwise, we 
(inaudible) at some point. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll take a brief, 
approximately five-minute recess. 
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This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Finding of Prima Facie Case 
for Punitive Damages Claim and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment RE: Punitive 
Damages and Second Cause of Action. 
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These motions came before the Court for oral argument on July 22, 2010. Plaintiffs were 
represented by their attorney, Brandon J. Baxter, at the hearing. Defendant was represented by its 
attorney, Levi J. Clegg, at the hearing. Prior to hearing oral argument, the Court reviewed all 
memorandum and supporting documentation regarding the parties' motions. 
Based on the written submissions from the parties, supporting documentation, and oral 
argument, the Court makes the following FINDINGS: 
1. The purpose of these particular proceedings is for the Court to determine whether 
Plaintiffs have established, by clear and convincing evidence, a prima facie case on the record 
that it is reasonably likely that the Plaintiffs can convince the trier of fact, by clear and 
convincing evidence, to enter an award punitive damages against the Defendant. 
2. This Court must also determine whether Plaintiffs are seeking the discovery of the 
wealth and financial condition of Defendant for the purpose of harassment. 
3. The Court finds that there has been no evidence or argument submitted which 
would indicate that Plaintiffs seek punitive damage discovery as a means of harassment. 
4. The Court finds that Plaintiffs are not seeking the discovery of the wealth and 
financial condition of Defendant for the purpose of harassment. 
5. To establish a prima facie case of punitive damages on the record, Plaintiffs must 
establish the following elements by clear and convincing evidence: 
A. A high degree of danger was apparent; 
B. Defendant knew or should have known its conduct would likely result in 
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substantial harm to another; 
C. Defendant engaged in highly unreasonable conduct or extreme departure 
from ordinary care. 
6. With respect to the "knowledge" element outlined above, the Court finds that the 
appropriate standard is the standard outlined in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc. 675 P.2d 
1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) which states that a claimant must show that a tortfeasor "knew or should 
have known" its conduct would likely result in substantial harm to another. 
7. To establish a prima facie case for punitive damages, the Plaintiffs do not have to 
prove "actual knowledge" on the part of Defendant. It is sufficient for Plaintiffs to show that 
Defendant knew or should have known its conduct would likely result in substantial harm to 
another. 
8. The final decision of whether the Defendant had actual knowledge that its conduct 
would likely result in substantial harm is a matter for the trier of fact, the jury. 
9. The Court finds, however, that the gas powered pump which was used in this case 
and which lead to the carbon monoxide poisoning had an explicit warning. Whether the 
individuals involved were technicians, supervisors, or other employees, the pump itself indicated 
that it shouldn't be operated in a closed environment. 
10. The Court finds that the overriding purpose of punitive damages is not 
punishment, but for purposes of public policy, as outlined in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc. 
675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). Punitive damages show others, similarly situated, that one 
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shouldn't engage in this type of activity, or one will be punished for that activity and the 
punishment may be severe. 
11. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case on the record, 
by clear and convincing evidence that in this case: 
A. A high degree of danger was apparent; 
B. Defendant knew or should have known its conduct would likely result in 
substantial harm to another; and 
C. Defendant's actions constitute highly unreasonable conduct or extreme 
departure from ordinary care. 
12. Plaintiff s motion should be granted. 
13. For the reasons outlined above, it follows that Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment against Plaintiffs' punitive damage claims is denied. 
14. With respect to Defendant's motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs' 
second cause of action, the Court does not see that Plaintiffs' second cause of action is intended 
to allow Plaintiffs to obtain duplicative recovery against Defendant. 
15. The Court finds that the cause of action alleged in Plaintiffs' second cause of 
action bears on the question of punitive damages and should, therefore, be heard by the jury. 
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Based on the foregoing it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: 
A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Finding of Prima Facie Case for Punitive Damages Claim 
is GRANTED. Plaintiffs may proceed with discovery related to punitive damages 
pursuant to U.CA. § 78B-8-201. 
B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment RE: Punitive Damages and Second 
Cause of Action is DENIED. 
DATED this J _ day otAttgnst 2010. 
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